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I. INTRODUCTION
We are all familiar with the cliche "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." The
sentiment is as applicable to law as it is to the rest of life. When a law does what
it is intended to do, legislators and courts should leave it alone. However, when a

Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. A.B., 1985, Brown
University; J.D., 1988, Emory University School of Law. I thank William J. Carney, Ann B. Maxey,
Gary Minda and Judith A.M. Scully. I am grateful for the support of the Hodges Fund and the
assistance of Michael T. Escue.
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law no longer serves its intended purpose, it is "broke," and should be revised. The
question is whether West Virginia's corporate law is "broke."
In 1974, the West Virginia Legislature adopted the West Virginia
Corporation Act (the "Act").' The Act brought then modem standards of corporate
law to West Virginia. Since that adoption, corporate law in West Virginia has
remained virtually unchanged However, the model codes on which the Act was
based have been substantially revised to reflect changes in business practices.3
Consequently, the Act no longer reflects modem standards of corporate law. The
failure to keep pace with the evolving standards of corporate law is particularly
interesting in light of the fact that the legislature has continually adopted and
revised other business entity laws in the state to keep pace with modem standards.4
A corporate law that reflects less than modem standards does not necessarily
translate into a broken corporate law. Modem standards of corporate law are not
necessarily appropriate for West Virginia. It does, however, suggest that the time
has come to reevaluate the Act. This Article begins that process.
Any reevaluation of the Act must start with a common understanding of the
purpose of the Act. Whether the Act succeeds in fulfilling its purpose must be
assessed within the context in which the Act functions. Therefore, Part II sets forth
the context in which the Act functions. I briefly explore the purpose of business
entity law in general. I also examine the recent evolution in business entity law,
including the trend towards enabling legislation and the evolving spectrum of
business entities. Next, Part III sets forth the purpose of the Act and the state of
business entity law in West Virginia, and Part IV explains why the Act has
stagnated while other business entity law in West Virginia has kept pace with
modem standards.
Having established the purpose of the Act and context in which it functions,
Part V examines whether the Act furthers its purpose. Using selected examples
from the Act,I examine the structure and the substance of the Act. Finally, Part VI
1974 W. Va. Acts 176.
2

See infra note 74 and accompanying text.

The Act is based on the 1969 version of the Model Business Corporation Act (the "MBCA")
and the 1964 version of the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act. Note, Corporations-A Survey of the
3

Pending West Virginia CorporationAct, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 50, 50 (1975).

The MBCA was

completely revised and reorganized in 1984. See 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN., Introduction (3d
ed. Supp. 1995). See infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text. The Model Nonprofit Corporation
Act also underwent comprehensive revision. See REv. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT, Introduction
(1988). While both business corporation law and nonprofit corporation law have been substantially
revised, this Article focuses on business corporation law.
See infra Part III.B.
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concludes that the Act is "broke." The time has come to reassess the purpose of
corporate law in the state, and to revise the Act accordingly.
II. THE CONTEXT

Whether the Act succeeds in fulfilling its purpose must be assessed within
the context in which it functions. The fundamental purpose of business entity law
has not changed. However, since the adoption of the Act, there have been
substantial developments in business entity law. These developments reflect a trend
favoring enabling legislation. Examples of this trend include the evolution of the
Model Business Corporation Act (the "MBCA") to the Revised Model Business
Corporations Act (the "RMBCA") and the expanding spectrum of business entities.
The results of this enabling trend is that organizers of business, usually
management, have previously unattainable flexibility in managing their business

entities.
A.

Purposeof Business Entity Law

In a capitalistic society, the goal of economic activity is to make money.5
Business entity law facilitates the organization of economic activity; it promotes
economic activity by establishing rules that govern the relationships between
owners, managers, and third parties.6 Like all substantive law, the intent is to
provide guidelines pursuant to which behavior is determined and standards pursuant

See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (explaining that the purpose
of corporation is to maximize shareholder profits); Adolph A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate
ManagersAre Trustees:A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV 1365, 1367 (1932) (arguing that corporations exist
solely to make a profit for their shareholders). But see Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and
PracticalFrameworkfor Enforcing CorporateConstituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 582-83
(1992) (questioning the paradigms underlying traditional corporate law); Lyman Johnson, The
DelawareJudiciaryand the Meaning of CorporateLife and CorporateLaw, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 867
(1990) (proposing that hostile takeovers in the 1980s have lead to reconsideration of the reasons for
the existence of corporations).
5

6

See Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Comment, The Alter Ego Doctrine:Alternative Challenges

to the CorporateForm, 30 UCLA L. RFV. 129, 133 (1982) ("The primary reason for treating the
corporation as a separate entity is to encourage the efficient operation of a free enterprise system.
Efficiency is achieved by reducing transaction costs, streamlining business operations, and encouraging
the aggregation of large amounts of capital. The separate entity status furthers these goals by providing
a convenient and efficient form for transacting business.") (footnotes omitted). See also Alchian &
Demetz, Production,InformationCosts, andEconomic Organization,62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778-89
(1972) (offering economic analysis of the desirability of associating for business purposes); Henry G.
Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 260 (1967)
(proposing development of corporations because of need to raise capital).
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to which disputes are resolved.7 Business entity law attempts to provide guidelines
that strike a balance between equity, fairness and efficiency!
Each state has a strong incentive to encourage organization of economic
activity under its laws. Business entity formation in a state generates revenue for

that state.9 In particular, business entity formation generates filing fees, franchise
taxes, license fees and taxes, and promotes employment and work for the local bar."

While managers of economic activity seek to realize a profit for the owners of that
activity, the state in which the economic activity is formed also seeks to derive
economic benefit.

See D. Michael Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure"Revisited With Some Afterthoughts
on the ConstitutionalProblems of "IrrebuttablePresumption," 30 UCLA L. REV. 189, 203 (1982);
see also Debra R. Cohen, The Single PublicaitonRule: One Action Not One Law, 62 BROOK. L. REV.
921, 953-55 (1996).
7

8

See Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1456 (1985)

("[The RMBCA] strikes a reasonable balance between equity and fairness on the one hand and efficient
corporate operation on the other."); William E. Kirk, 1I, A Case Study in Legislative Opportunism:
How Delaware Used the Federal-StateSystem to Attain CorporatePre-Eminence, 10 J. CORP. L. 233,
236 (1984) (arguing that various interests are served by corporate law-creditors, investors and general
public); Lopez, supranote 6, at 133-135 (proposing that corporate statutes provide a convenient and
efficient form to transact business.); Mitchell, supra note 5, at 584 ("T]he essential goal of corporate
law [is] to restrain managerial self-dealing - by conforming directors' duties, stockholders' rights,
constituents' rights, and enforcement mechanisms.... ").
9

See William J. Carney, The PoliticalEconomy of Competitionfor CorporateCharters,26

J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 306-7 (1997) ("[l]t produces franchise tax revenues for the chartering state but

also because interest groups within the state are benefitted by this activity."); Carol R. Goforth, The
Rise ofthe Limited LiabilityCompany: Evidence of a Race Between the States, But Heading Where?,
45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1193, 1193-94 (1995) ("Any state which induces a significant number of
businesses to choose that forum in which to incorporate stands to gain significant financial benefits,
or at least certain groups within such states stand to benefit.") (footnotes omitted); John A Mackerron,
Variety of Choice in the CorporateLaw "Menus" of the Great Lakes States, 71 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 469, 470 (1994) ("Incorporations are a source of tax revenues and create other more general
economic benefits for a state."); Roberta Romano, The State CompetitionDebate in CorporateLaw,
8 CARDOzO L. REV. 709, 710 (1987) ("[R]evenues derived from franchise taxes provide a powerful
incentive for state legislatures to implement corporation codes that will maintain the number of
domiciled corporations, if not lure new firms to incorporate in their state."); William Cary, Federalism
and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974).
10

Carney, supra note 9 (franchise tax revenues, interest groups within the state benefit); Cary,

supra note 9, at 668 (franchise tax revenue); Goforth, supra note 9 (certain groups gain significant
financial benefit); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Towards an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware CorporateLaw, 65 TEx. L. REy. 469, 492 (1987) (indirect benefits like fees to accountants
and attorneys); Mackerron, supra note 9, at 470 (tax revenues, and other general economic benefits);
Romano, supranote 9 (franchise tax revenues).
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States generally recognize the internal affairs rule. 1 States also generally

recognize foreign entities.12 At a minimum, a state may not keep a foreign entity

11

The internal affairs rule states that the internal affairs of a business entity are governed by
of
the state of creation. This rule is almost universally accepted in corporate law. See
the laws
RESTATE1EN (SECOND) OF CONFLICTOFLAWS § 302 (1971) ("[L]ocal law of state of incorporation
will be applied to determine such issues."). See also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S.
69, 89 (1987) (stating that "[n]o principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established
than a state's authority to regulate domestic corporations"); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Parel
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983) ("[T]he law of the state of incorporation
normally determines issues relating to the internal affairs of a corporation. Application of that body
of law achieves the need for certainty and predictability of result while generally protecting the justified
expectations of parties with interests in the corporation."); Jennifer J. Johnson, Risky Business: Choiceof-Law and the UnincorporatedEntity, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 249, 268-275 (1997); P. John
Kozyris, The Limited Liability Company: Does it Exist Out-of-State? What Law Governs It?, 64 U.
CIN. L. REV. 565, 569 (1996) (noting that lex incorporationisfor the internal affairs of a corporation
is widely accepted); Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal
Affairs, 48 LAW & COmEWI. PROBS. 161 (1985); Willis L.M. Reese & Edmund M. Kaufman, The Law
GoverningCorporateAffairs: Choice of Law and the Impact ofFull Faithand Credit, 58 COLUM. L.
REv. 1118 (1958) (arguing that relationships among the corporation, its directors, officers, and
stockholders are generally governed by the law of the state of incorporation). Many states have
codified the internal affairs rule by negative inference. Johnson, supra,at 271-272. See W. VA. CODE
§ 31-1-49(a) (1996) ("[Nlothing in this article contained shall be construed to authorize this State to
regulate the organization or the internal affairs of such corporation."); 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
§ 15.05(c) (3d ed. Supp. 1995) (This statute "does not authorize this state to regulate the organization
or the internal affairs of a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this state."). The
internal affairs rule has found growing acceptance, both judicially and through statute, in limited
liability companies ("LLCs"). UNiF. LTD. LIABLrry Co. ACT § 1101, 6A U.L.A. 498 (1995); Kozyris,
supra,at 568. The same is true for limited partnerships and limited liability partnerships. See REv.
UNIF. LTD. PARTNERsHipACT, § 901, 6A U.L.A 254 (1976); UNiF. PARTNERSHIm ACT § 1101,6 U.L.A.
66 (Supp. 1997). Partnerships are generally governed by the law of their principal place of business.
See UNIF. PARTNERSHIp ACT § 106, 6 U.L.A. 25 (1994).
A state may restrict a foreign entity from engaging in intrastate commerce. See Louis K.
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 544 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The Federal Constitution does
not confer upon either domestic or foreign corporations the right to engage in intrastate commerce in
Florida. The privilege of engaging in such commerce in corporate form is one which the state may
confer or may withhold as it sees fit."). West Virginia may prevent a foreign corporation from carrying
on its business within the state. See Floyd v. National Loan & Inv. Co., 38 S.E. 653 (W. Va. 1901).
The legislature may prescribe limitations under which foreign corporations may do business in this
state. See Archer v.Baltimore Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 30 S.E. 241 (W. Va. 1898); Toledo Tie & Lumber
Co. v. Thomas, 11 S.E. 37 (W. Va. 1890); Penberthy Electromelt Co. v. Star City Glass Co., 135
S.E.2d 289 (W. Va. 1964). See also 4 MODEL. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 15.01 (3d ed. Supp. 1995); W.
VA. CODE § 31-1-49 (1996).
12
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from conducting interstate commerce."3 Therefore, organizers of economic activity
can organize under the laws of a state with more advantageous law regardless of

where they conduct business. The state of incorporation, by virtue of its more
advantageous law, will reap the derivative economic benefit. i4 Scholars have long
discussed competition among states for business formation. It has been termed both
the "race for the bottom" '15 and the "climb to the top."' 6 Traditionally, this debate

13

The United States Constitution does not permit a state to exclude a foreign entity from

conducting interstate business. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. While the privileges and immunities clause
has not been held applicable to business entities, under the clause, a state may not prohibit a citizen
from one state from entering into intrastate commerce in another state. See id. at art. IV, § 2.
Additionally, there is an argument that full faith and credit requires a state to recognize an entity
formed in a sister state. See id. § 1. See also Reese & Kaufman, supra note 11.
14
"Lesser states, eager for the revenue derived from the traffic in charters, had removed
safeguards from their own incorporation laws." Liggett, 288 U.S. at 557. See Kirk, supra note 8, at
243 ("[S]trict laws would probably not prevent a corporation from doing business in the state, but
would only cause it to seek its charter (and pay its taxes) elsewhere.").
The states where business is conducted still reap some economic benefit. Most states
minimize the economic loss of organization in another state by imposing fees on foreign business
entities when they conduct intrastate activity. In 1997, West Virginia increased filing fees for foreign
entities seeking to qualify to do business in the state. The filing fee to qualify as a foreign corporation
was raised from $10 to $100, and the filing fee to qualify as a foreign LLC was raised from $10 to
$150. See WEST VIRGrNiA CORPORAnTONS, PARTNER SHPS AND ASSOciATONs LAW ANN. 553 (Michie
1994); WEST VIRGINIA BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS LAWS ANN. 607 (Michie 1997).

Justice Brandeis voiced concern over state competition for corporate charters. See Liggett,
288 U.S. at 557-564. He decreed that "[t]he race was one not of diligence but of laxity." Id. at 559.
He wrote that
[t]he removal by the leading industrial states of the limitations upon the size and
powers of business corporations appears to have been due, not to their conviction
that maintenance of the restrictions was undesirable in itself, but to the conviction
that it was futile to insist upon them; because local restriction would be
circumvented by foreign incorporation.
Id. at 557. Professor Cary coined the phrase "race for the bottom" in his article. Cary, supranote 9,
at 705. In his article, Professor Cary expressed his concern over the movement of state corporate law
towards "the least common denominator." Id. at 663.
15

16
See Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections of Recent
Developments in Delaware'sCorporationLaw, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 920 (1982). See also Peter
Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Marketfor CorporateCharters: "Unhealthy Competition" Versus
FederalRegulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980); Romano, supra note 9.
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has been couched in terms of competition for corporate charters; however, it applies
equally well to the growing spectrum of business entities.'
While business entity rules are designed to strike a balance. between the
various interested parties, the balance among the parties changes over time to reflect
developments in the business community. Essentially, the battle comes down to the
struggle between two conceptual philosophies: the contractarian theory and the
regulatory theory." The contractarian theory, also known as the enabling theory,
views business entity law as d substitute for private contracts. 9 Statutes provide
default rules that the parties may revise to suit their particular needs. They are
designed to reduce transactions costs. 20 Contractarians believe that managers and
owners should have complete freedom to negotiate the terms of their contract and
that shareholder protection will be provided by the market, which will appropriately
value the entity in accordance with the contractual terms.2' The regulatory theory,

also known as the legal constraint theory or institutional theory, views business
entity law as a series of mandatory restrictions imposed as a condition of creation.'

17

State competition for business entities has expanded to include competition for LLCs and

LLPs. See Goforth, supranote 9; Larry E. Ribstein, StatutoryFormsfor Closely Held Firms: Theories
and Evidence From LLCs, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 369, 430-31 (1995) ("[T]he rapid evolution of the LLC
demonstrates that jurisdictions compete for formations of closely held firms."). The effect of state
competition for business has also arisen in other areas law. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental
Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and is it "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997)
(environmental laws).

For a concise overview of the two philosophies, see HENRY N. BUTLER, AND LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 1-28 (1995). This discussion is also generally
Is

couched in terms of corporations, but it applies equally well to other types of business entities.
Economists refer to "the firm." See Ronald Coase, The Nature ofthe Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
19

See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIScHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

CORPORATE LAW 2-18 (1992); Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance ofthe Duty of
CareStandardin CorporateGovernance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 (1989) ("[Ihe corporation is nothing
more than a nexus of contracts made between and among self-interested individuals."); Coase, supra
note 18; Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965).
20

Statutes provide a standard form contract which reduces the transaction costs associated with

formation and operation of an entity. See Ribstein, supra note 17, at 374-380 (discussing that
transaction costs include fees for customizing contracts, information costs, and interpretation costs).
21

See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 19; Coase, supra note 18; Ribstein,

supra note 17.
See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE MODERN
Bradley & Schipani, supra note 19, at 5.
2

CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
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The regulations are designed to protect shareholders and third parties because the
market does not.
Contractarians believe state competition in business entity law is a "climb

to the top" because shareholders are rational and will not invest in entities in which
owner concerns have been ignored.' Regulatory theorists believe state competition
in business entity law is a "race for the bottom" because the shift towards
management-oriented rules is usually at the expense of owner-oriented protection.24
Contractarian theory and regulatory theory are "abstract polar extremes."e Neither
theory alone explains all corporate law. Business entity law should and does
contain elements of both theories - the enabling rules, which may be modified, and
the mandatory rules, which may not be modified.26

2

Fischel, supra note 16, at 917; Goforth, supra note 9, at 1270.

See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Discrimination, Managerial Discretion and the Corporate
Contract,26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 541, 541-42 (1991) ("Developments in the 1980s and 1990s
suggest another fundamental shift of authority from owners to managers."); Cary, supra note 9 (arguing
that Delaware's statutory and judicial corporate law favors management and therefore encourages
incorporation; however, it is harmful to shareholder welfare.); Goforth, supra note 9, at 1270 ("[S]tates
which pander to the interests of management over shareholder concerns are likely to be more successful
in attracting corporations.").
24

Bradley & Schipani, supranote 19, at 5. However, if statutes become too enabling, abuses
are likely to occur and then the pendulum is likely to swing back with resurgence of mandatory
provisions. See Mark J. Loewenstein, A New Directionfor State CorporateCodes, 68 U. COLO. L.
REv. 453, 457 (1997).
2

See M. Thomas Arnold, AdministrativeAspects of State CorporationLaw, 28 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1 (1994); Bradley & Schipani, supranote 19, at 5 ("It is undoubtedly the case that both liability
rules and market forces are important in constraining the behavior of corporate officials."); Hamilton,
supra note 8, at1455 n.4 ("[A]lthough corporation law obviously does have contractual aspects, some
regulation was necessary."); Robert R. Keatinge, Corporations,UnincorporatedOrganizations,and
Unincorporations:Check the Box and the Balkanizationof Business Organizations,I J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 201,216 (1997) ("Organizational characteristics fall into two categories: those that
are merely default rules which are subject to modification... and those that constitute mandatory rules
that may not be modified .... ).
26
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The Enabling Trend
Over time business entity law has become more flexible?7

In the

competition for revenues generated by business formation, many states have
amended existing and adopted new business entity law to make their laws more

attractive to management? 8 Although mandatory rules still exist, as incorporation
and reincorporation decisions are made by management, the revisions have shifted
power to management.2 9
The evolution of the MBCA to the RMBCA is a particularly good example
of this trend.3" The American Bar Association drafted the MBCA to provide states

27

For a century, statutes dealing with the law of corporations have evolved toward

greater flexibility. For example, states have steadily eroded restrictions on
mergers, corporate activities, and variations on the corporate form by closely held
firms. In addition, the 1980's and 1990's saw the rapid development and spread
of antitakeover mechanisms. Recent developments concerning unincorporated
firms also have permitted significantly greater flexibility and accommodation to
the needs of individual firms.
Larry E. Ribstein, ChangingStatutoryForms, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 11, 13-14 (1997).
28

"Mhose amending the various statutory forms are driving all forms toward each other. The

drafters ar6 attempting to allow businesses to register under whatever title they need for external
regulatory advantage, and at the same time, contract specifically for the internal form of organization
they prefer." Dale A. Oesterle & Wayne M. Gazur, What's in a Name?: An Argumentfor a Small
Business "LimitedLiability Entity" Statute (with Three Subsets of DefaultRules), 32 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 101, 104 (1997).
29

See Brown, supra note 24, at 550 ("States had a financial incentive to encourage more

companies to enter, while management had incentive to go where the restraints were the least.
Limitations on management, therefore, continued to recede at the expense of shareholders."); Cary,
supra note 9; Goforth, supranote 9.
30

The evolution of the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA") to the Revised Uniform Partnership

Act ("RUPA") and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("ULPA") to the Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act ("RULPA") also reflects this enabling trend in business entity legislation. RUPA
provides more specificity than its predecessor. For example, RUPA provides express fiduciary duty
standards and conditions under which disassociation of a partner does not dissolve the partnership.
See RUPA §§ 404, 601, 801 (1996). However, RUPA also "reflects the supremacy of the partnership
agreement and minimizes mandatory rules among partners." Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy
DecisionsAnimate Revision of Uniform PartnershipAct,46 Bus. LAW. 427,428 (1991). RULPA also
provides more specificity while increasing flexibility. The restrictions on the degree of control limited
partners may exercise is a key example. ULPA provided a general limitation which was subject to
judicial interpretation; however RULPA provides more specific limitations, which in fact increase
flexibility because limited partners can ascertain the governing standard prior to acting. CompareUNIF.
LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 7, 6A U.L.A. 336 (1916) and UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303, 6A
U.L.A. 144 (1976). See also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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with a guide to modem business standards for state law revision.31 The MBCA was
"a modem state act that preserve[d] in proper balance the interests of the state and
the rights and interests of corporations, shareholders and management. 3' 2 It
combined sound principles of existing corporate law with new ideas that had been
successfully incorporated in some states while eliminating obsolete principles
which still existed in the corporate law of many states.33 The MBCA was very
influential in state law revisions. 4
By 1984, however, there had been so many "areas in which state

experimentation had produced significant simplifications and innovations which
were appropriate for inclusion,"35 that the MBCA was completely revised. The
result was the RMBCA

6

The changes were both structural and substantive. 7

See MODEL BUs. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 1, 2 (2d ed. 1971). The purpose of the MBCA is to
provide "a convenient guide for revision of state business corporation law, embracing the interest of
the state and the rights and interests of the corporation, shareholders and management." Id.; see also
Ray Garrett, History,Purpose and Summary of the Model Business CorporationAct, 6 Bus. LAW. 1,
2 (1950). The MBCA was first published in 1950. It was based on the Illinois Business Corporation
Act of 1933. It was drafted by the Committee on Corporate Law for the Section of Corporations,
Banks, Business Law of the American Bar Association [hereinafter Committee on Corporate Law].
MODEL Bus. CORP. AT ANN. § 1, 2 (2d ed. 1971).
31

32

Garrett, supra note 31, at 7.

Id. at 2-3. The MBCA preserves shareholder rights including limited liability and the right
to examine books and records. Discarded provisions include recording requirements, use of the
corporate seal, residential qualifications for directors, requirement that meetings be held in the state,
and many instances where the defense of ultra vires was previously available. Id. at 3.
33

The MBCA was the basis for corporate statutes in 23 states and the District of Columbia, and
was used extensively in drafting the corporate law in nine states. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 1,
2 (2d ed. 1971); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 1, 2 (2d ed. Supp. 1977). Professor Hamilton
notes, however, that a number of states have "gone it alone" including Delaware, California, New
York, and Pennsylvania. Hamilton, supra note 8, at 1455 n.4.
34

35

1 MODEL Bus. CORP. AT ANN., Introduction (3d ed. Supp. 1995).

The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act has also undergone substantial revision and was
replaced by the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act in 1987. See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT
CORP. ACT (1988). A discussion of these revisions is beyond the scope of this Article. For more
information on these revisions, see Lizabeth A. Moody, The Who, What, and How of the Revised
Model Nonprofit CorporationAct, 16 N. KY. L. REV. 251 (1989).
36

37

1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN., Introduction (3d ed. Supp. 1995). As discussed in more
detail infra, the model act was reorganized and renumbered. Substantive changes included elimination
of the traditional legal capital rules and artificial restrictions on classes of shares, revision of the
shareholder derivative action rules, and the right to dissent. Additionally, provisions like an express
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Whereas the MBCA was "a middle of the road statute... offering more than a
modicum of shareholder protection,"3' 8 the RMBCA reflects a dramatic procorporate manager shift 9 "[O]pinions will differ about whether the RMBCA
pursues 'flexibility' and 'modernization' too aggressively, at the cost of
'shareholder protection."' 40
Despite the model acts, corporate law has not become uniform; the
enabling trend is reflected to various degrees in different states' corporate statutes.4 '
In our federal system, these differences give management an opportunity, by careful
selection of the jurisdiction of incorporation, to avoid mandatory rules imposed by
a state's legislature. Management may incorporate in whichever state provides the
most advantageous law. Once incorporated, management may conduct interstate
commerce, and may qualify as a foreign corporation in any state to conduct
intrastate commerce.
C.

Evolving Spectrum of Business Entities

As there are transaction costs associated with organizing a business in a
than the state of primary activity, like the cost of qualifying as a foreign
other
state
entity, organizers have strong incentives to organize in the "home" state.4"
Historically, the only option available to the organizers of a business seeking
limited liability was incorporation. If the state's corporate law was undesirable,
management would assess whether the benefits from incorporating in another state

duty of care were added and shareholder inspection rights were expanded. See infraPart V.
38

See Douglas M. Branson, Recent Changes to the Model Business CorporationAct: Death

Knellsfor Main Street CorporationLaw, 72 NEB. L. REV. 258, 259 (1993).
39

Id. at 260. This is not surprising as the drafting committee is comprised predominantly of

management oriented lawyers. See Hamilton, supra note 8, at 1458.
40

Hamilton, supranote 8, at 1468. The model act cannot be too extreme. "[1]f the [m]odel

[a]ct goes too far ahead of the states' corporate bar thinking, the [a]ct will lose its effectiveness and
be ignored." Id. at 1470.
See Mackerron, supra note 9, at 517 (analyzing the corporate laws of nine states, and
concluding that "[n]o two of the nine statutes are exactly the same, suggesting that states do offer
different variations of legal rules with respect to corporations."). There is a question of whether
uniform corporate law would be good. While it would provide some advantages in interstate
commerce, however, it might also retard development by squelching experimentation. See Oesterle
& Gazur, supranote 28, at 107-08.
41

42

See Ian Ayres, JudgingClose Corporationsin the Age ofStatutes, 70 WASH. U.L.Q. 365,

374-376 (1992).
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outweighed the associated costs" Today, the growing spectrum of business entities
provides many more options. Rather than incorporate in another state, management
may organize in another form in the home state. The result is the creation of a
business entity with the desired characteristics (usually flow-through taxation and
limited liability for owners), with reduced transaction costs, and without the
undesirable restrictions in the state's corporate law.
When organizing economic activity, the organizers choose a form that,
based on their specific circumstances, provides the most advantage. The decision

43

See id.
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is based on an analysis of both tax and non-tax factors.

Traditionally, the

available forms of business organizations were the sole proprietorship, the general
and limited partnership, and the corporation. Although sole proprietorships are the
When organizing economic activity, the organizers choose the entity that provides the desired
characteristics. Stereotypically, each business entity can be identified by particular default
characteristics. Although many of the characteristics may be modified by agreement, the following
chart presents a simplified representation of the default characteristics of each business entity:
44

Option Characteristics
I

Sole
Proprietorship

General
Partnership

Limited
Partnership

Limited Liability
Partnership

Limited Liability
Company

Corporation

Definition

Single
individual owns
and operates the
business

Two or more
persons carrying
on as co-owners
of a business for
profit

A partnership
with one or
more general
partners who
manage the
business and
one or more
limited partners
who do not
actively
participate in
management

A general
partnership that
provides some
limited liability
for partners

An entity that
combines the
characteristics
ofapartership
and a
corporation

A separate legal
entity that exists
independently
ofits owners

Governing Law

No specific
governing law

Revised
Uniform
Partnership Act

Revised
Uniform
Limited
Partnership Act

Article 10 of the
Revised
Uniform
Partnership Act.

Uniform
Limited Liability
Company Act

Revised Model
Business
Corporation Act

Creation

Conduct, no
required
formalities

Conduct, no
required
formalities

Filing &fee
required

Filing & fee
required

Filing & fee
required

Filing & fee
required

Owner Liability

Yes, owner has
unlimited
liability

Yes, partners
have unlimited
liability

General
Partners have
unlimited
liability;
however,
Limited
Partners have
limited liability

Each partner
has unlimited
liability for
his/her own
actions, but
limited liability
with respect to
the action of
other partners

No, members
have limited
liability

No.
shareholders
have limited
liability

Taxation

flow-through

election of
partners

election of
partners

election of
partners

election of
company

entity taxation
unless elect
Subchapter S
status

Management
Structure
(owner
managed or
centralized
management)

Owner manages

Partners
manage unless
agree otherwise

General
Partnem
manage

Same as general
partnership

Election of
company in
articles of
organization,
either member
managed or
manger
managed

Centralized
managersBoard of
Directors and
Officers

Transferability
of ownershiip
interest

Freely
transferable

Limitations on
transfer

Limitations on
transfer

Same as general
partnership

Limitations on
transfer

Freely
transferable

Yes

Yes

Same as general
partnership

Yes

Yes

Perpetual of
Existence

No, limited to
life of sole
I proprietor

I

I

I
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most prevalent mode of conducting business, corporations are a popular choice
because they provide owners with both limited liability and the ability to take an
active role in management. 4 Unfortunately there are drawbacks to the corporate
form. It carries significant federal tax consequences, generally referred to as the

double-tax.4 Additionally, other regulations may restrict a business from operating
in the corporate form.47

Over the past decade, in response to the needs of modem business, the
spectrum of business entities expanded to include the Limited Liability Company
("LLC") and the Limited Liability Partnership ("LLP").4 s The LLC and LLP were
viewed as panaceas. These new forms provide management with the ability to
create an entity with flow-through taxation and limited liability. While these new

According to the United States Bureau of the Census, in 1984 there were three million active
corporations but thirteen million proprietorships. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, I
(1986). People function as sole proprietorships or partnerships because they require no start-up action
or costs. "The principal advantage of a corporation has been the limited liability afforded to the owners
of the corporation, that is, generally the shareholders of the corporation are not personally liable for
the obligations of the corporation ....
" MICHAEL A. BAMBERGERS & ARTHUR J. JACOBSON, STATE
LIMITED L1ABiITY COMPANY AND PARTNERsHip LAWS § 1 (1998).
45

46

See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olsen, A Callfor a Unified Business OrganizationLaw,

65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 10 (1996) ("Since its inception, the Internal Revenue Code... has imposed
a two-tier structure of taxation on corporations while treating partnerships... as mere aggregations
of their partners not separately taxable as a business entity."); William J. Rands, PassthroughEntities
and Their UnprincipledDifferencesUnderFederalTax Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 15, 16 (1995) ("No one,
of course, can ignore the federal income tax consequences of operating the business - too often they
constitute the single greatest cost affecting the choice of form issue."). The exception, two-tier
taxation, is the subchapter S election. A subchapter S corporation is taxed like a partnership; however,
to qualify for this election, the corporation must satisfy the statutory restrictions. These restrictions
were recently revised to be more liberal; however, they still limit the number and type of owners. See
26 U.S.C.A. § 1361 (Supp. 1998).
Professional associations often restrict members from limiting liability. For example, until
1992, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants limited members to practice as
proprietorships, partnerships, and professional corporations. See Robert R. Keatinge, et al., Limited
47

LiabilityPartnerships: The Next Step in the Evolution of the UnincorporatedBusiness Organization,
51 Bus. LAW. 147, 158 (1995). The Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct prohibit lawyers from
prospectively restricting their liability. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h)

(1989). Additionally, state regulations may restrict operation in the corporate form. See Oesterle &
Gazur, supranote 28, at 109-111.
See Keatinge, supranote 47 (stating that the growth was a response "to the needs of modem
business"); Matheson & Olson, supra note 46, at 3 ("Many states boast over a half dozen separate
statutes and codes governing the organization and operation of business entities."); Ribstein, supra
note 27, at 12-13 (discussing rapid growth of LLC and LLP legislation).
4S
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business entity laws borrow from existing law, they provide organizers of business
entities with more options than ever before.49
The most recent tax development in business entity law was the advent of
the "check-the-box" regulations in January 19970 Check-the-box permits
unincorporated business entities to elect taxation as either a partnership or
corporation without complying with the traditional formalistic rulesO5 These
regulations have largely eliminated the tax factor from the entity selection decision,
permitting organizers to focus on other, more specific, concerns: 2
The development of check-the-box has also given rise to a new debate
questioning whether the current array of business entity laws is necessary.53 Some
commentators argue that so many distinct statutes, each with its own default rules,
creates a "hodge-podge of unwieldy, illogical, and even irrational legislation and

decisions bristling with incoherence and inconsistencies."54 Other commentators

argue that different entity forms suit different businesses and that, tax and limited
liability issues aside, these different entity laws have value 5 Who is right? Only
time will tell. Business entity law is in the midst of an era of evolution. It is

See Keatinge, supranote 26 at 212-713 ("[B]usiness organization statutes... often borrow
provisions from statutes governing another form of business organization.... many LLC statutes
contain provisions borrowed from both traditional corporation and partnership statutes."); Ribstein,
supra note 17, at 382 ("The efficiency of combining terms into coherent sets also explains why a
separate business form.., is more efficient than adapting the corporate form... ").
49

50

26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (1996).

The Internal Revenue Service adopted these

regulations, effective January 1, 1997, to simplify the classification of business entities for tax
purposes.
Check-the-box eliminates the traditional formalistic rules referred to as the "Kitner
regulations." See 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-2 (1996). The Kitner regulations provided that an entity
would be taxed as a corporation if it possessed at least three of four distinguishing characteristics continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability, and free transferability of interest.
51

52

See Keatinge, supra note 26, at 202.

See Symposium, Check-the-Box and Beyond: The Future of Limited Liability Entities,52
Bus. LAW. 605 (1997). See also Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited
LiabilityEntities, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (1997).
53

54

Matheson & Olson, supra note 46, at 3.

55

See Keatinge, supra note 26, at 247; Ribstein, supra note 17, at 383 ("[T]here is an
efficiency justification for a business association statute that is distinct from general partnership in
providing for limited liability, and from other limited liability forms (i.e., corporation and limited
partnership) in providing for direct member participation in management.").
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interesting to note, however, that in spite of the expanding entity options, the
corporation is still a dominant choice for new businesses. 6
III. BUSINESS ENTITY LAW IN WEST VIRGINIA

A.

The Purposeof the Act
West Virginia's corporate law derives from Article XI of the Constitution

of West Virginia. Article XI section one of the constitution provides that "[t]he

legislature shall provide for the organization of all corporations hereafter to be
created, by general laws."' This approach to state incorporations was an alternative
to the traditional approach of chartering corporations by special act."

56

See Keatinge, supranote 26, at 202. For a brief discussion of why corporations are still the

dominant choice, see infra note 97 and accompanying text.
57

W. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. The West Virginia Constitution also mandates limited
stockholder liability for corporate debt and cumulative voting for directors. See id. § 2 ("The
stockholders of all corporations... shall be liable for the indebtedness of such corporations to the
amount of their stock subscribed and unpaid, and no more."). This requirement has been codified in
West Virginia Code section 31-1-89. See W. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (amended 1958):
[I]n all elections for directors or managers of incorporated companies, every
stockholder holding stock having the right to vote for directors, shall have the
right to vote, in person or by proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned by
him, for as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected, or to
cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the number of
directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock, shall equal, or to
distribute them on the same principle among as many candidates as he shall think
fit; and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any other manner.
Id.; W. VA. CODE § 31-1-89 (1996) (A shareholder "shall be under no obligation to the corporation or
its creditors with respect to such shares other than the obligation to pay to the corporation the full
consideration for which such shares were issued ....
"). More recently, the West Virginia Constitution
was amended to permit the issuance of more than one class of stock. See W. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4
(amended 1958) ("[Eivery corporation ... shall have power to issue one or more classes and series
within classes of stock ....). This has been codified under West Virginia Code section 31-1-78. See
W. VA. CODE § 31-7-78 (1996) ("[S]hares may be divided into one or more classes, any or all of which
classes may consist of shares with par value or shares without par value, with such designations,
preferences, limitations and relative rights as shall be stated in the articles of incorporation.").
58

See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative

Voting, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 124, 143, n.46 (1994); Kirk, supra note 8, at 244.
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Originally based on Virginia law, West Virginia corporate law provisions
were scattered among multiple chapters relating to corporationsO9 Like most states'
corporate law, the purpose of West Virginia's corporate law is to encourage
incorporation in the state." For a short period, just prior to the turn of the century,
West Virginia was successful in its bid to attract incorporations." However, by
1901, West Virginia lost its popularity. 2
In 1930, the West Virginia Legislature adopted a restated code which
revised, consolidated, and simplified West Virginia statutory law 3 This was the
first comprehensive revision to the state's corporate law The result was chapter
thirty-one of the West Virginia Code, which eliminated obsolete provisions, and
assembled the remaining provisions under proper headings in appropriate chapters.6
All general provisions regarding the creation of a corporation were consolidated in
a single chapter containing nine articles. 6

For example, in the West Virginia Code of 1868, chapter 52 addressed corporations
generally, while chapters 53 and 54 regulated joint stock companies, and chapter 55 addressed
59

incorporated associations other than joint stock companies. See,

OFFICIAL CODE OF WEST VIRGINIA

Report of the Revisers of the Code to the Governor at xi (1931).
60

Since the mid 1800s, states have been competing for corporate charters. See Liggett Co. v.

Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557-564 (1933).
61

From 1883 to 1888, West Virginia issued 330 charters to corporations that had their principal

place of business elsewhere. Kirk, supra note 8, at 244.
62

See Liggett 288 U.S. at 557 n.34. Around 1901, West Virginia increased its annual tax. This

may be attributable to the fact that, at some point, price cutting to attract incorporations becomes
unprofitable. Id.
63

Adopted April 3, 1930, effective January 1, 1931. See OFFICIAL CODE OF WEST VIRGINIA

Report of the Revisers of the Code to the Governor at xi (1931).
64

The revisions were based on the corporate statutes of Delaware, Maryland, Maine,

Massachusetts, and Illinois. Id.
65

The revised code contains 63 chapters, in contrast to the then existing code which contained

approximately 180 chapters. See id.
66

The restated code "consolidate[s] into one article all of the general provisions for chartering

and organizing corporations for every purpose for which a corporation could be chartered or organized
under existing laws." OFFICIAL CODE OF WEST VIRGINIA chapter 31, revisers' note at 776 (1931). This
included business and charitable corporations. Id Provisions applicable to specific types of
corporations, like railroad companies and banking institutions comprise the subsequent eight articles.
See OFFICIAL CODE OF WEST VIRGINIA chapter 3 1, art. 2-9 at 778-781 (1931).
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The purpose of the revision was explicitly stated in the revisers' note. First,
the legislature intended that the reorganization would promote more careful
observance of the law.67 Second, the legislature hoped to encourage businesses to
incorporate in West Virginia and, as a result, generate additional revenue." These
are meritorious goals for the state corporate law and they comport with the general
purpose of business entity law.69 A statute, whatever its subject matter, cannot be
effective if it is does not set forth the relative rights and duties in a clear manner
such that affected parties know where they stand and the ramifications of their
actions.7" Certainty is a fundamental purpose of statutory law. A consolidated and
simplified corporate law promotes this goal. Additionally, because it is easier to
use, it encourages incorporation in the state, in turn promoting economic benefit in
the state.
In the decades following this comprehensive revision, corporate law
continued to evolve.!7 ' In light of the many changes, in 1972, the legislature formed
The West Virginia Corporation Law Study Committee to review the state's
corporate law. The study committee proposed a second comprehensive revision of
the state's corporate law modeled on the MBCA and the Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act.72 The result was the Act - a statute that deals with the
organization of all corporation, business and nonprofit.
Unlike the 1930 restated code, the Act contains no express statement of
purpose. Despite this omission, the logical inference is that the purpose of the Act
remains unchanged. Like its predecessor, the purpose of the Act is to promote
careful observance of the law and encourage incorporation in the state, thereby
generating revenue. This inference is drawn from two facts. First,the Act contains
no statement to the contrary. Second, the Act was modeled on the MBCA. As
indicated above, the purpose of the MBCA was to promote better understanding and

67

OFFICIAL CODE OF WEST VIRGINIA chapter 31, revisers' note at 776 (1931).

68

Id.

See supraPart II.A. Of course, state corporation law will only encourage incorporations if
it is perceived favorably by the people making the incorporation decision, usually management.
69

70

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

Many of these changes were chronicled in the MBCA. See supra notes 31-34 and
accompanying text.
71

72

See supranote 3.
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administration of corporate law.' As West Virginia modeled its law on the MBCA,
it follows that it has the same purpose. This is particularly likely as the purpose is
similar to the previously stated purpose of West Virginia corporate law. While
silence alone is not particularly persuasive, when combined with the second fact,
it supports the conclusion that the adoption of the Act did not change the purpose

of West Virginia corporate law.
B.

Other Business Entity Law

Although the Act has remained essentially static since its adoption,74 West
Virginia has maintained modem standards in all other business entity law.
Unfortunately, like the Act, the statutes contain no statement of legislative purpose
and there is no legislative history explaining the underlying intent. The logical
inference is that, similar to the Act, modem business entity law has been adopted
to encourage economic activity in the state.75
Generally, West Virginia's legislature adopts uniform business legislation
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law
("NCCUSL"). 76 When the NCCUSL revises a business entity statute, the legislature
73

See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.

The Act, as originally adopted in 1974, was perceived to be flawed. Therefore, before
becoming effective in 1975, the Act was submitted to the Special Committee to Study the
Recodification of the Corporation Laws of West Virginia, established by the West Virginia State Bar,
for review. Corporations-A Survey ofthe Pending West VirginiaCorporationAct, supra note 3, at
50. Most of the amendments provided clarifications. See W. VA. CODE § 31-1-19 (1996) (adding
"unless otherwise provided in the bylaws" as an introduction); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-36 (1996) (adding
"by the shareholders or members"); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-46 (1996) (adding "and a certified copy" and
"or recording"); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-48 (1996) (adding subsection (d) explaining what activities
would not be considered to be transacting business in the state); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-109 (1996)
(adding a requirement that any articles of amendment contain a statement of the name and address of
the person who prepared it). Additionally there were some amendments to add fees and filing
requirements. See W. VA. CODE § 31-1-15 (1996) (amended to provide for atwo dollar filing fee);
W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1-56a and 31-1-56b (1996) (added to require the filing of annual reports and the
penalty for failure to comply).
74

75

See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.

76

The legislature's proclivity for adopting uniform law is not new. It is also not limited to

business entity law. West Virginia has adopted 47 uniform laws. See ULA DIRECTORY OF UNIFORM
ACTs & CODES TABLES-INDEX MASTERS EDITION (1997). Generally a state adopts uniform law
because it thinks it will become uniform or because it thinks it is a "carefully drafted, well reasoned
proposal.' Larry E. Ribstein, A Critiqueof the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON
L. REv.311, 315 (1995).
The importance of uniform business law is well recognized. In Swift v. Tyson, Justice Story
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follows suit and revises the appropriate West Virginia business entity law. Like the
MBCA and RMBCA, uniform law is designed to provide states with a welldeveloped body of law on a particular subject matter while substantially reducing
the transaction costs generally associated with drafting and interpreting a new

statute.77 Although the state clearly reaps benefits from adopting uniform law, there
are also associated costs.
Wholesale adoption of uniform business entity law reduces the transaction
costs associated with adopting a new statute, but the policy decisions underlying the

various provisions may not be appropriate for West Virginia!' West Virginia is not
perceived as a commercial state! 9 The balance among owners, managers and third
parties may not be the same as the balance in a more commercially oriented state. 80
Additionally, the legislature cannot adopt or revise business entity law in a vacuum.

explained that a uniform national law, particularly in the commercial arena would permit a person in
one state to know the ramifications of his actions in another state. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 19
(1842), overruled by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In other words, uniform laws
facilitate interstate commerce. See WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAW 13 (1991).
Uniform laws are an amalgamation of laws derived from the experiences in various states.
They provide states with statutes which have been tested by use. See Fred H. Miller, The Future of
Uniform State Legislationin the PrivateLaw Area, 79 MINN. L. REV. 861,867 n.23 (1995). However,
unlike uniform laws, neither the MBCA nor the RMBCA seeks uniform acceptance. They are intended
as guidelines for incremental improvements. See Hamilton, supra note 8, at 1470.
77

78

Policy choices underlying uniform laws are not always adequately disclosed. See Miller,

supra note 76, at 875. Additionally, all interests may not be represented in the drafting process. See
id. at 873. For example, the RMBCA was drafted by a committee comprised of predominantly
management oriented lawyers and the result was a pro-management statute. See supranotes 38-39 and
accompanying text.
Gordon, supra note 58, at 148, 165. West Virginia corporations are predominantly closely
held. There are less than twenty publicly traded corporation that are incorporated in West Virginia.
Of these corporations, one is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, another is traded on the
American Stock Exchange and the remainder are traded in the over-the-counter market. Briefly,
around the turn of the century, West Virginia was successful in its bid to attract incorporations. See
supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
79

80

West Virginia, on occasion, has deviated from uniform law to protect public policy issues.

For example, when adopting revised article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which is a pro-bank
statute, the legislature revised some provisions to protect consumers.
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The legislature must remain alert to the effect that changes to one statute have on
other statutes."
In 1953, West Virginia adopted the Uniform Partnership Act,8 2 and the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act.83 In 1981, the legislature adopted the Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1976), s4 and when the NCCUSL again revised
the limited partnership law in 1985 and 1986, the legislature adopted these
modifications.85 West Virginia was also among the first states to adopt the Revised

Uniform Partnership Act when the NCCUSL promulgated it in 1995.86
In 1992, West Virginia expanded the available business entity options by
adopting legislation authorizing LLCs. 7 As there is no legislative history, it is

81

For example, the adoption of RUPA creates serious problems for the state's limited

partnerships. RULPA provides that the Uniform Partnership Act governs any cases not provided for
in the limited partnership statute, expressly referring to West Virginia Code section 47-8A-1. See W.
VA. CODE § 47-9-63 (1996). However, when the legislature adopted RUPA, it repealed the UPA. See
infra notes 82 and 86 and accompanying text. The limited partnership statute is now ambiguous. Does
it refer to the repealed UPA or RUPA? If it refers to RUPA, there is the additional problem that RUPA
expressly excludes limited partnerships from its scope. See W. VA. CODE § 47B-2-2(b) (1996). For
a detailed discussion of the problem and the various solutions, see Allan W. Vestal, A Comprehensive
Uniform LimitedPartnershipAct? The Time Has Come, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1195 (1995).
82

1953 W. Va. Acts 139 (repealed 1995).

83

1953 W. Va. Acts 140.

84

See 1981 W. Va. Acts 208.

85

See 1984 W. Va. Acts 41; 1984 W. Va. Acts 160; 1984 W. Va. Acts 167.

86

After more than seventy years, the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association

determined it was time to review the UPA. The report recommended extensive revisions. See Uniform
Partnership Act Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated
Business Organizations, Should the Uniform PartnershipBe Revised?, 43 Bus. LAW. 121 (1987). The
result was the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA") (1994). See REV. UNiF. PARTNERSHIP AcT,
6A U.L.A. 1-124 (1995). West Virginia is one of twelve states to adopt RUPA. See id, at 6 U.L.A.
I (Supp. 1997). RUPA moves away from the aggregate theory toward the entity theory, rewrites the
rul~s on dissolution to provide more stability, minimizes mandatory rules among partners, and stresses
the preeminence of the partnership agreement. See Weidner, supra note 30.
87

See W. VA. CODE §§ 3 1-lA-1 to -69 (repealed 1995). West Virginia was one of the first

states to adopt LLC legislation. See Mary Elizabeth Matthews, The Arkansas Limited Liability
Company: A New Business Entity is Born, 46 ARK. L. REV. 791, 798 n.39 (1994) (placing West
Virginia among the first 18 states to enact LLC legislation); Ann Maxey, West Virginia'sLimited
Liability CompanyAct: Problemswith the Act, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 905, 906 (1994) (stating that West
Virginia was the thirteenth state to adopt LLC legislation); Goforth, supranote 9, at 1228 (stating that
West Virginia was the ninth state to adopt LLC legislation).
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difficult to be certain of its goal. However, this new legislation appears to have
been motivated by a desire to enhance economic development 8 As there was no

uniform LLC law at that time of adoption, the legislation, drafted by Jackson &
Kelly, was based loosely on Virginia's LLC statute. 9 There were concerns about
the original statute.90 In 1996, the legislature repealed its LLC act and replaced it

with the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act ("ULLCA")?1 While revising the

West Virginia LLC statute was a good decision, it is not clear that wholesale
adoption of the ULLCA was the best choice. 2
At the same time it revised the LLC statute, the legislature also created a

fifth business entity option; the LLP.93 As there was no uniform law available for

88

See supranote 17. The LLC provided formerly unattainable flexibility for the organizers

of business - a hybrid entity that gave members limited liability and flow-through taxation. See supra
note 44. See also Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. LAW.
1, 2-3 (1995). The perception was that LLCs would help the state to attract and retain small
businesses. See Goforth, supranote 9, at 1228. Additionally, foreign LLCs conducting business in the
state were eager to ensure recognition of their limited liability status. See Johnson, supra note I I at
277; Kozyris, supranote 11, at 540. Most LLC statutes include an internal affairs provision for foreign
LLCs. See supranote 11 and accompanying text; infra note 111 and accompanying text.
89

See Goforth, supra note 9, at 1228.

90

See Maxey, supra note 87. Concerns included the fact that members were "not treated on
parity with West Virginia shareholders or limited partners." Id. at 967. Members also lacked the
protection of indemnification and a mechanism by which they could bring a derivative action. Id. at
968. Additionally, there was no statute of limitations to cut off creditors' claims. Id.
91

The NCCUSL promulgated the ULLCA in 1994; however, it has been subsequently revised.
See UNiF. LTD. LiABiLITY Co. ACT, 6A U.L.A. 429-508 (1995). West Virginia adopted the ULLCA
in March 1996. See W. VA. CODE §§ 31B-l-101 to -13-1306 (1996).
92

Professor Ribstein concludes that the "ULLCA is not even a suitable model for future LLC

legislation. ULLCA makes many poor policy choices, including terms that are unsuited for informal
firms, unnecessary mandatory rules, and rules that are inappropriately borrowed from other business
forms. The drafting is often convoluted, complex and otherwise inept." Ribstein, supranote 76, at
387. The ABA concurs with Professor Ribstein that "no state should rush to scrap its current law to
adopt this one." Id. Professor Maxey suggested that the state form a committee to investigate whether
the ULLCA would meet the needs of West Virginia business persons. Maxey, supra note 87, at 969
n.185. However, the state did not follow this sound advice.
93

The LLP is governed by an additional new article inserted into the state's partnership act.
See W. VA. CODE § 47B-10-1 to -5 (1996).
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adoption at that time, the legislature loosely relied on Texas Limited Liability
Partnership law.94
It is not clear whether revising existing and creating new business entity law
has helped West Virginia attract businesses from other states to organize under
West Virginia law. My impression is that, overall, the state has not been successful.
Although revenues in 1997 and subsequent years will probably increase, this is
probably attributable to the recent increase in the fee schedule.95
Although the new business entities have been well received, they have in
no way replaced the corporation. While the exact number of LLCs and LLPs is not
readily available, many have been formed. This has not, however, significantly
changed the number of corporations formed in the state each year! 6 There are many
reasons why corporations are still a dominant choice of entity. Aside from general
inertia, many existing corporations could not convert without serious tax
ramifications, and some business people have expressed scepticism and concerns
about forming new entities with as yet unknown statutory interpretation.97
Therefore, the question remains, why has the Act stagnated when all other business
entity law has been kept current?
IV. WHY THE ACT HAS STAGNATED
The answer to this question lies in the legislative process. When adopted,
statutes represent the legislative majority view of the best means of dealing with a
situation based on current needs. However, as time passes, situations change, and

Uniform law was subsequently promulgated by the NCCUSL. It is found in RUPA. See
UNIF. PARTNERHSHIP ACT (1994) with 1996 Amendments constituting the UNiF. LTD. LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 8 (Supp. 1997).
94

95

Increased fees went into effect in July 1997. See supra note 14.

96

The Secretary of State was unable to provide the number of LLCs and LLPs that have been

formed; however, anecdotal evidence supports this assertion. With respect to incorporation in West

Virginia, in 1990, 2542 corporations were formed; in 1991, 2219 corporations were formed; in 1992,
2236 corporations were formed; in 1993, 2406 corporations were formed; in 1994, 2326 corporations
were formed; in 1995, 2535 corporations were formed; and in 1996, 2380 corporations were formed.
Dunn & Bradstreet Corporation, New Businesses and Corporations,32-38 CURRENT ECONOMIC
INDICATOR 12 (1990-1996).
97

See Keatinge, supra note 26, at 233-241; Symposium, supra note 53, at 623-627.
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the changed circumstances are not reflected in the existing statutes 8 As Professor
Gilmore noted, "getting a statute enacted in the first place is much easier than
getting the statute revised so that it will make sense in the light of changed
conditions."99
To undertake revision of a statute, the potential gain must outweigh the
transaction costs." ° Professor Eisenberg offers two reasons why statutory revisions
have been slow to occur in the corporate arena.' ' First, there is limited incentive
to lobby for revision of any single state's archaic corporate law.' °2 The corporate
internal affairs rule, combined with a corporation's ability to incorporate in one
state and transact business in other states, eliminates the incentive to lobby for
revision of any single state's archaic corporate law. 3 Second, corporate law is
comprised of non-neutral rules, rules which predictably and systematically promote
the interest of a particular class - shareholder, management, and in some cases,
creditors. Revising non-neutral rules affects the relative rights of these classes.
Such a revision raises interest group and information problems.' If all the classes
were well organized, they would lobby the legislature, and the decision would be
one of political power. However, when one of the classes is not well organized the
system does not function as well. If the injured class is not organized, it cannot
bring the information before the legislature, and the legislature is unlikely to raise
the issue itself.0

98

See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5-6 (1982). "A well

drafted statute will deal sensibly with the issues which have come into litigation during the twenty or
twenty-five years which preceded the drafting. However, the focus of litigation has a way of shifting
unexpectedly and unpredictably." GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (1977).
99

GILMORE, supra note 98, at 95.

Transaction costs are costs associated with the process of creating and implementing a new
law. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
100

1

Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Modernization of CorporateLaw: An Essayfor Bill Cary, 37

U. MIAMI L. REV. 187 (1983).
102

Id. at 188.

Id. If the cost of avoiding the rule is less than the cost of revising the rule, there is no
rational reason for a state to undertake the cost of revision.
103

104

Id.at 189-90.

105

Id. at 190.
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The Act is a perfect example. When adopted, the Act reflected modem
standards for corporations. In the interim, significant developments in corporate
law have not been reflected in the Act. If these changes are appropriate for West
Virginia, revising the Act seems the obvious solution. However, revising the Act
involves transaction costs, not only to the legislature, but also to the corporate bar
and the people who use the corporate law, namely shareholders and management.
Probable transaction costs include time and money that would need to be allocated
to draft and learn the revised law. These transaction costs must be balanced against
the benefits expected from the revisions. Expected benefits would be increased
revenue, and possible increased flexibility.
Although some provisions of the Act may be disadvantageous to
management,"0 6 as a class, management has little incentive to seek revision. In
accordance with Professor Eisenberg's first reason, rather than incur the transaction
costs involved in revising the Act, management will incorporate in another state and
qualify the corporation as a foreign entity in West Virginia. Under the corporate
internal affairs rule, corporate matters will be governed by the more attractive laws
of the state of incorporation. Alternatively, management may form a different entity
which provides substantially similar characteristics within West Virginia.
On the other hand, some provisions of the Act are disadvantageous to
shareholders. As shareholders as a class do not control incorporation decisions,
they have more incentive to seek revision. However, shareholders have not lobbied
to revise the Act. In accordance with Professor Eisenberg's second reason,
shareholders are not generally a well-organized constituency and do not efficiently
bring issues to the legislature.
Additionally, as there are no West Virginia representatives serving on the
Committee on Corporate Law which promulgates the RMBCA, the West Virginia
Legislature is likely unaware of many of the revisions that have been made to the
model corporate law. Unless the problem is placed effectively before the
legislature, there is no impetus for the legislature to undertake the transaction costs
08
associated with revision. Consequently, the Act remains stagnant."

106

For example, the legal capital rules are archaic and restrict management; mandatory

cumulative voting limits management entrenchment; and the lack of an express duty of care leaves
management without appropriate guidelines. See infra Part V.B.1, 2, & 4.
107

For example, the events that trigger a shareholder's right to dissent are not sufficiently broad.

See infra Part V.B.3.
108

"[A]Ithough an area of statutory corporate law has become badly outmoded in a manner that

has an unsound impact.., the problem is not effectively brought to the legislature's attention."
Eisenberg, supra note 101, at 191. The result is that the "legislature may fail to make needed changes
to modernize its corporate law." Id.
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The remaining question, then, is why have other West Virginia business
entity laws been so successfully adopted and revised. New business entity law has
been successfully adopted because, as Professor Gilmore indicated, it is much easier
to adopt a new statute than revise an old one.0 9 Additionally, West Virginia
professional groups, like lawyers and accountants, actively lobbied for the adoption
and revision of LLC legislation and the adoption of LLP legislation because these
statutes provided them with some limited liability protection, which might
otherwise have not been available.1 LLCs and LLPs formed outside of West
Virginia that sought to do business in the state were concerned that they might not
be accorded limited liability status in West Virginia. Eager for legislative
recognition of their limited liability status, they lobbied the legislature to adopt LLC
and LLP provisions which recognized foreign LLCs and LLPs."'
West Virginia partnership law and limited partnership law have been
successfully revised for two reasons. One reason is the availability of information.
West Virginia regularly adopts modernized uniform legislation because the
legislature is aware of the revisions and their importance. The legislature is aware
of these changes because West Virginia has two active commissioners serving on
the NCCUSL."' Additionally, articles, like Professor Ann Maxey's analysis of the
state's original LLC legislation, provided the legislature with the necessary
information to act."1 The second reason these laws have been successfully revised
is because a particular constituency, often the bar, has viewed the value of revision

109

See GILMORE, supra note 98.

110
See Gary W. Derrick, Oklahoma Limited Liability Companies and Limited Liability
Partnerships,22 OKLA. CrryU. L. REv. 643, 669 (1997) ("The American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants undertook a nation-wide lobbying effort to secure passage of LLP legislation."); Goforth,
supra note 9, at 1274 (1995) ("In addition to attorneys, business groups such as local Chambers of
Commerce were also supportive of LLC legislation ....
professional associations, particularly
Certified Public Accountants' groups, supported LLC legislation." ); Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 28,
at 105 ("The LLC was propelled through legislatures by a force of accountants, tax lawyers and
business development lobbies"). It also provided potential revenue. See Goforth, supra note 9, at
1272-74.
III
If a state did not recognize foreign, entities and did not provide that these entities are
governed by the state of their creation, courts would likely treat them as partnerships. This would
undercut the desired characteristic of owner limited liability. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 277-78;
Kozyris, supranote 11, at 565.
The current commissioners from West Virginia are Richard E. Ford, John L. McClaugherty,
and Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
112

113

See Maxey, supra note 87.
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as greater than the transaction costs, and therefore has effectively lobbied for the
change.
V. Is IT "BROKE"?
I now turn to analyze whether the structure and substance of the Act further
the purpose of the Act. I examine the structure of the Act in light of modem
legislative drafting conventions, and I compare it to the structure of contemporary
corporate law and other business entity law. I examine the substance of the Act by
comparing selected provisions of the Act to contemporary corporate law and other
business entity law. For modem legislative drafting conventions, I refer to the
Drafting Rules for Uniform or Model Acts (the "Drafting Rules") approved by the
NCCUSL." 4 For corporate law, I compare the Act to the RMBCA." s For other
business entity law, I compare the Act to the other West Virginia business entity
laws.
A.

Structure of the Act

"The principal functions of an [a]ct are (i) to create or establish, (ii) to
impose a duty or obligation, (iii) to confer a power, create a right, or grant a
privilege, and (iv) to prohibit.'. 6 The Act is a series of non-neutral rules that sets
forth the relative rights and duties of corporations in West Virginia." 7 To be
effective, the Act must set forth these rights and duties in a manner that can be
understood, such that management, shareholders, and third parties know where they
stand and the ramifications of their actions.'

114

DraftingRulesfor Uniform or Model Acts,

HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF

COMMIssIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAW AND PROCEEDINGS, 421-438 (1989) [hereinafter Drafting

Rules].
I use the RMBCA as a guideline of modem business corporate law for two reasons. First,
West Virginia based the Act on the MBCA. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Second, the
RMBCA reflects many of the changes that have occurred and become widely accepted in corporate
law. See supranotes 30-40 and accompanying text.
115

116

DraftingRules, supra note 114, at 421.

See LAWRENCE E. FILSON, THE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER'S DESK REFERENCE 87 (1992).
Statutes are "the crystallization and expression in definitive form of a legal right, privilege, function,
duty, status or disposition." Id. To be effective, they must "inform the intended audience." Id.
117

118

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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The structure ofthe Act is important in advancing this end. To be effective,
the Act "must be cast in language that is clear, consistent, legally effective,
technically sound, administrable, enforceable, and constitutional; is correct in form
and style; and is as readable and aesthetically pleasing as possible.... 9 Historically
the legislature recognized this necessity. Reorganization of the code to create a law

more easily followed was a stated purpose for the 1930 revision. 2 ' Today, in light

of current drafting conventions, and in comparison to other statutes, the structure

of the Act is not ideal.
1.

Organizational Matters

The Act, which is divided into four parts, combines business and nonprofit
provisions in the same article.' This creates a disjointed statute that is difficult to
use and likely to cause confusion. For example, if management or shareholders

want to voluntarily dissolve a business corporation the relevant provisions are
scattered throughout both the general provisions and the business corporation

provisions."

Similarly, if management or shareholders want to amend the articles

of incorporation or merge into another corporation, the relevant provisions are
distributed between the general provisions and the business corporations

119

FILSON, supra note 117, at 8. ("The essentials of good bill drafting are accuracy, brevity,

clarity and simplicity."); Drafting Rules, supra note 114, at 421-430.
120

See supra note 67 and accompanying text.

121
Part I deals with introductory issues, like construction, scope of application, and severability.
W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1-1 to -5 (1996). Part H deals with corporations generally. W. VA. CODE §§ 31-16 to -76a (1996). Part III deals with business corporations. W. VA. CODE §§ 3 1-1-77 to -135 (1996).
Part IV deals with nonprofit corporations. W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1-136 to -158 (1996).

122
Among the general provisions of Part II, W. VA. CODE § 31-1-39 (1996), sets forth the
required contents of the articles of dissolution, W. VA. CODE § 31-1-40 (1996), addresses filing the
articles of dissolution and the certificate of dissolution, W. VA. CODE § 31-1-48 (1996), articulates the
effect of dissolution, including survival of remedy, and W. VA. CODE § 31-1-61 (1996), sets forth the
requirement ofa tax certificate in order to dissolve. Among the business corporation provisions of Part
III, W. VA. CODE § 31-1-124 to -126 (1996), provide the means for voluntary dissolution by
incorporators, shareholders and the corporation, W. VA. CODE § 31-1-127 to -129 (1996), set forth the
requirements and effect of the statement of intent to dissolve, which is distinct from the certificate of
dissolution, and W. VA. CODE § 31-1-130 to -133 (1996), provide for revocation of voluntary
dissolution proceedings.
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provisions." A business corporation needs to delve through two parts of the Act
to ascertain all applicable statutory law on any given issue. Additionally, the
business corporation must be wary of inadvertently applying a nonprofit corporation

provision.
Other than the changes required by the combination of the business and

nonprofit corporations in the same article, the organization of the Act substantially
parallels the organization of the MBCA. In comparison to modem drafting
conventions, this organization is substandard. The only subdivisions delineated in
the Act are the four parts. 24 Related provisions are not consistently grouped
together.'2 There are no topic headings and subheadings to help identify related

provisions. Additionally, the numbering style among the various provisions is
inconsistent; some26provisions use an outlining format, while others simply use a

paragraph format.

The limited ad hoc changes which have been made to the Act have left it
even more disjointed. 27 While the changes have instituted valuable modem
policies, and corrected some problems, 28 these piecemeal revisions have created

123
With respect to amendment of the articles of incorporation, W. VA. CODE § 31-1-31 to -33
(1996), address filing requirements and effect of amending the articles and W. VA. CODE § 31-1-106
to -111 (1996), address the procedures for, and form of, amendments. With respect to mergers or
consolidation, W. VA. CODE § 31-1-34 to -38 (1996), address the procedures for merger or
consolidation and W. VA. CODE § 31-1-117 to -119 (1996), deal with the required approval, the
articles of merger or consolidation, and subsidiary mergers.
124

See supra note 121.

125

See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.

126

Compare W. VA. CODE § 31-1-28 (1996) (provision for filing of articles of incorporation

which denotes subsections in paragraphs with (a) and (b)) and W. VA. CODE § 31-1-33 (1996)
(provision for filing of restated articles of incorporation which does not use any outlining, only
paragraphs).
127

The revisers' note to chapter 31 of the 1931 Official Code of West Virginia points out that

the prior code was "made up of many different acts of the legislature passed at different times since the
organization of the state, and much duplication of needless matter necessarily arises from the manner
in which these statutes originated." OFFICIAL CODE OF WEST ViRGINIA chapter 31 revisers' note at 776
(1931). In support of her suggestion to adopt a new limited liability statute, Professor Maxey points
out that ad hoc amendments often create ambiguities. Maxey, supranote 87, at 969.
128

For example, West Virginia Code section 31-1-73, was amended in 1989 to add a subsection

permitting meetings by conference call or similar electronic communications. See W. VA. CODE § 311-73 (1996). Additionally, West Virginia Code section 31-1-25 was repealed because it duplicated
section 31-1-73; and section 31-1-97, relating to directors' conflict of interest, was moved from Part
III where it was applicable only to business corporations to section 31-1-25, in Part II where it is now
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inconsistencies. For example, in 1992, the provision permitting business
corporations to limit or deny preemptive rights, and the provision requiring
corporations to file annual reports, were repealed. 29 However, conforming changes
were not made and references to these repealed provision were not deleted from
remaining provisions.13 0
Modem drafting conventions assert that a statute should be arranged
"rigorously and systematically."'' A statute should be "as clear and accurate as
possible, with the relationship between the main and subordinate ideas made readily
apparent, and the subjects to be covered are arranged so that they can be found,
understood, and referred to with the least possible effort."'3
The 1930 revision consolidated all general provisions for chartering and
organizing corporations, business or non-profit, in a single article. The revisers saw
no reason to have different proceedings for corporate organization. The intent was
to provide a consolidated and simplified statute that would, because it was easy to
use, promote careful observance and encourage businesses to incorporate in West
Virginia.' The Act continued this practice. 3 From the legislature's perspective,
combining the general provisions for business and nonprofit corporations in the
same article is efficient. This consolidation permits the legislature to set forth the
requirements applicable to all corporations, like organizational and filing rules, only
once. While historically this may have been a desirable organization, today it is not.

applicable to all corporations. See W. VA.
129

CODE

§§ 31-1-25, -72, -97 (1996).

See W. VA. CODE § 31-1-90 (repealed 1992);W. VA. CODE § 31-1-27 (1996). The repeal

of section 31-1-90 was logical because it was duplicative. West Virginia Code section 31-1-27(b)(4),

provides" (b)... the articles of incorporation shall set forth :"(4) Any provisions limiting or denying
to shareholders the preemptive right to acquire additional unissued or treasury shares of the
corporation." W. VA. CODE § 31-1-27 (1996). See also W. VA. CODE § 31-1-56a (repealed 1992)

(annual reports).
See W. VA. CODE § 31-1-84 ("Subject to the provisions of section ninety [W. VA. CODE §
31-1-90 (1996)] of this article... "); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1-56(b) to -62 (referring to section 31-1-56a
130

providing possible penalties for failure to file the once required annual report).
131

REED DICKERSON, THE FuNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 16 (2d ed. 1986).

132

FILSON, supra note 117, at 59.

133

See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.

134

See supra Part III.A.
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According to modem drafting conventions, subdivisions and heading
designations promote clarity and precision, thereby making the statute easier to
understand.135 According to Rule 24 of the Drafting Rules, a statute should be
organized "in the most useful and logical format for the reader."'36 Sections dealing
with a common subject should be grouped together.137 Headings should inform the
user of the contents of the provision.'3 8 Numbering schemes should be consistent.
These may seem to be simple stylistic matters; however, they are important because
they affect readability.'39
While initially the organization of the MBCA was deemed "the best that
can be devised,""'' over time, the organization of the MBCA was found to be "not
entirely logical"'' In particular, the piecemeal revisions to the MBCA over many
years had caused some drafting inconsistencies, and the ordering of sections was not
optimal. When the MBCA was revised in 1984, the drafters reorganized the
provisions, grouping related provisions together, and arranging the groups in a
logical order with appropriate chapter and subchapter headings.' 42 By conforming
to some simple statutory drafting rules, particularly with respect to formatting, the
RMBCA became a much more user-friendly statute. For example, in the RMBCA,
all provisions relating to dissolution are now found in chapter 14; all provisions
relating to voluntary dissolution are grouped together in subchapter A, while
provisions relating to administrative dissolution are grouped together in subchapter
B and provisions relating to judicial dissolution are grouped together in subchapter

135

FILSON, supra note 117, at 220.

136

DraftingRules, supranote 114, at 428.

137

Id.

138

See DICKERSON, supra note 131, at 190; FILSON, supra note 117, at 226.

139

DICKERSON, supra note 131, at 190 (noting that topic headings are a neglected device for

making a statute more readable).
140

Garrett, supranote 31.

141

1 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. Introduction (3d ed. Supp. 1995).

See 1 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. Introduction (3d ed. Supp. 1995). As the MBCA never
combined business and nonprofit provisions in the same article, the confusion created in the Act was
never a concern.
142
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C. 143 The same is true for the provisions relating to merger or consolidation which
are grouped together in chapter 11. The new organization, with descriptive
subheadings and consistent numbering within sections, vastly simplifies finding
provisions.
As West Virginia generally adopts uniform law, on the whole, its other
business entity laws conform to modern legal drafting conventions. Related
provisions are grouped together in articles under appropriate headings. For
example, West Virginia's LLC statute groups related provisions together in thirteen
articles, each of which has a descriptive heading." The same is true of West
Virginia's partnership statute, which is broken down into eleven articles, each with
a descriptive heading.'45 These statutes also utilize a consistent numbering style.

The current organization of the Act is difficult to work with. The scattering
of related provisions among the various parts is likely to cause confusion. A
confusing statute neither promotes careful observance of the law, nor encourages
businesses to incorporate in the state. Therefore, it does not further the purpose of

the Act. If a user is not certain that he has found all the relevant provisions, then,
contrary to its purpose, the Act does not promote careful observance of the law.
Although those who have mastered the Act are unlikely to have difficulty, the
current structure imposes a barrier on the unsophisticated business person seeking
to incorporate. It also imposes a barrier on the new attorney, and the out-of-state

attorney who is unfamiliar with the Act. Rather than incur the cost of learning the
Act, they may, instead, incorporate elsewhere. In the end, the current structure of
the Act discourages incorporation in the state.

See 3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACTANN. § 14 (3d ed. Supp. 1995). This is also true of chapter
10, amendments, which is divided into subchapter A for amendments to the articles of incorporation
and subchapter B for amendments to the bylaws, and chapter 13 on dissenters' rights which is divided
into three subchapters; A, the right to dissent, B, procedure for dissent and C, judicial appraisal.
143

144

See W. VA. CODE chapter 31B (1996). The chapter's articles include the following: Article

1. General Provisions; Article 2. Organization; Article 3. Relations of Members and Managers to
Persons Dealing with LLC; Article 4. Relations of Members to Each Other and to LLC; Article 5.
Transferees and Creditors of Member; Article 6. Member's Dissociation; Article 7. Member's
Dissociation When Business Not Wound Up; Article 8. Winding Up Company's Business; Article 9.
Conversions and Mergers; Article 10. Foreign LLCs; Article 11. Derivative Actions; Article 12.
Miscellaneous Provisions; Article 13. Professional LLCs.
See W. VA. CODE chapter 47B (1996). The chapter's articles include the following: Article
1. General Provisions; Article 2. Nature of Partnership; Article 3. Relations of Partners to Persons
Dealing with Partnership; Article 4. Relations of Partners to Each Other and to Partnership; Article 5.
Transferees and Creditors of Partner; Article 6. Partner's Dissociation; Article 7. Partner's Dissociation
when Business Not Wound Up; Article 8. Winding Up Partnership Business; Article 9. Conversions
and Mergers; Article 10. LLPs; Article 11. Miscellaneous Provisions.
145

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss1/7

32

Cohen: West Virginia Corporate Law: Is It "Broke"?
1997]

WEST VIRGINIA CORPORATE LAW

The solution is simple. First, separate the business and nonprofit
provisions; revise the Act to deal solely with business corporations and create a new
act to govern nonprofit corporations. Then, redraft the Act in accordance with
modem drafting conventions. If the Act were reorganized so that like provisions
were grouped together under appropriate subheadings, using a consistent outline
format, substantial confusion would be eliminated. Even where there are no
substantive changes, these drafting revisions would produce a clearer, more
readable and more useable statute, and therefore, be more likely to further the
purpose of the Act.
2.

Consistency of Word Choice

The Act contains three different definitions of "corporation." In parts I and
II, "corporation" is defined as a business corporation or a nonprofit corporation.' 4 6
However in part I, "corporation" is defined exclusively as a business corporation;
147
and in part IV, "corporation" is defined exclusively as a nonprofit corporation.
When referencing the Act, if a user is not focused on the particular part of the Act,
she could easily misconstrue a provision by applying the wrong definition of a
"corporation."
Consistency is also imperative in word choice; in fact, it is the golden rule
of drafting.44 Rule five of The Drafting Rules for the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws states that the drafter should "[b]e
consistent in the use of language throughout the Act."' 49 Consistency in
terminology affects substantive clarity. The comment to the Drafting Rules
explains that the consistency in terminology prevents "different interpretations of
similar provisions.""' Consistency requires that a drafter should never change her
146

See W. VA. CODE §31-1-6(f) (1996).

147

See W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1-77 to -136 (1996).

148

See SCOTr J. BuRNHAM,

DRAFTING

CONTRACTS 228 (2d ed. 1988) ("Never change your

language unless you wish to change your meaning and always change your language if you wish to
change your meaning."); DICKERSON, supranote 131, at 15 ("[S]trive for complete internal consistency
of terminology, expression and arrangement."); FILSON, supranote 117, at 215; DraftingRules, supra
note 114, at 422 ("Be consistent in the use of language throughout the Act. Do not use the same word
or phrase to convey different meaning. Do not use different language to convey the same meaning.").
The Act attempts to deal with this potential confusion by providing a rule of construction. See W. VA.
CODE § 31-1-2 (1996).
149

DraftingRules, supra note 114, at 422

150

Id.
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word choice unless she intends to change her meaning; and that she should always

change her word choice if she intends to change her meaning. This prevents similar
interpretation of different provisions. This rule is intended to avoid just that
confusion which the three definitions of "corporation" in the Act cause.
Like the other structural problems, this is easily resolved. If the Act is

revised to separate business and nonprofit provisions, the problem disappears. If
not, the legislature could simply define different terms for different types of

corporations.
B.

Substance of the Act
1.

Legal Capital Rules

While the Act eliminated a few archaic legal capital rules in West
Virginia,"' it generally retained the traditional legal capital structure. Under the
Act, paid-in capital must be segregated into stated capital and capital surplus and
the use of these funds is restricted.'52 The Act continues the concept of treasury
shares."' It also continues the concept of earned surplus, and generally limits payouts to shareholders to this surplus.'54
Legal capital rules were originally developed to protect third party
creditors.'55 These mandatory rules were intended to assure creditors that, despite

"The pending Act omits the current requirement that the amount of capital with which the
corporation will commence business must be included in the articles." Corporations-A Survey of the
Pending West Virginia CorporationAct, supranote 3, at 59 (referring to W. VA. CODE § 31-1-6(d)(3)
(1972 replacement volume)). See also id.at 118-123.
151

152

See W. VA. CODE § 31-1-85 (1996). Stated capital is that portion of consideration received

for the issuance of shares equal to the par values of the shares. W. VA. CODE § 31-1-6(q) (1996).
Capital surplus is any excess consideration received in consideration for the shares. W. VA. CODE §
31-1-6(e) (1996).
See W. VA. CODE § 31-1-6(t) (1996). Treasury shares are shares which were issued and
reacquired by the corporation but not canceled or returned to authorized but unissued shares. They
are deemed issued but not outstanding.
153

154

See W. VA. CODE § 31-1-6(h) (1996). Earned surplus is all surplus except capital surplus;

often referred to as net profits. W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1-83, -99, & -100 (1996). Generally, distributions
must be made from earned surplus; however, in limited circumstances they may be made from capital
surplus.
155
See BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 12 (3d ed. 1990). John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/EnablingBalance in CorporateLav: An Essay on the JudicialRole, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1633 (1989).
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statutory limited liability afforded to owners, the corporation had a certain amount
'
of "permanent capital."156
The capital rules, at least in theory, provide an equity
cushion thereby protecting creditors by restricting the amount and sources of money
shareholders may withdraw from the corporation. 57 At the same time, legal capital
rules provide the corporation with a measure of assurance that creditors will not
seek to foreclose too quickly."' They also provide some protection to shareholders.
For example, the par value rules were intended to insure that each shareholder
contributes equitably - pays a minimum value for her shares.'59
Theory and practice have not converged; legal capital rules have not been
effective. 6 While historically, there was some relationship between the value of
the corporation and its stated capital, over time, stated capital became an abstract
number obtained by multiplying the number of shares outstanding by the par value
assigned to each share. 6
In a bygone era, all shares had a par value and most probably were
issued at a price equal to par value. In that era, the concept of legal
capital had a certain economic significance: legal capital was
conventionally more or less equal to the economic capital created
by the issue of stock."" However, "[w]ith the introduction of
penny-par stock and then no-par stock, the par doctrines were in

See I MODELBus. CoRP. ACrANN. § 6.21 (3d ed. Supp. 1995); Wood v. Dummer 30 F. Cas.
435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (trust fund for creditors). Creditors "want to preserve a cushion of protective
assets.... [so] that no claimants who rank junior to [them] ... make off with assets of the corporation
while the creditor's claim is still outstanding and unpaid." MANNING & HANKS, supranote 155, at
11.
156

Coffee, supra note 157; Kirk, supra note 8, at 237 (explaining that creditors want to require
substantial assets, prevent encumbrances on these assets and limit payouts to shareholders, and that
these objectives are aided by limitations in the corporate law).
157

See William W. Bratton, Jr., CorporateDebt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of
Restructuring,1989 DUKE L.L 92, 101.
158

159

See MANNING & HANKS, supra note 155, at 17.

160

See Coffee, supra note 155, at 1634; Bratton, supra note 158, at 106-07.

Eisenberg, supra note 101, at 199 ("Modem statutes, however, do not require that shares
have a par value, and even shares that have a par value may carry a par value much lower than the price
at which they are issued.").
161

162

Id.
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trouble."' 63 "Accordingly, the economic capital generated by the
issue of stock may be much greater than the corporation's legal
capital, which has become a mere legal construct determined in a
wholly arbitrary manner."6
Additionally, while distributions and dividend payments are statutorily limited to
certain legal capital sources, the rules can be manipulated and, in the end, are
meaningless. 6
Therefore, the "statutory legal capital machinery provides little or no
significant protection to creditors of corporations."' 66 The legal capital rules no
longer assure creditors that the corporation has substantial assets. Additionally, the
legal capital rules never prevented the erosion of corporate cash flow, nor did they
prevent the incurrence of additional, possibly secured or senior, corporate debt. 67
These rules have become merely "a legal invention,.., not relatable in any way
to the ongoing economic condition of the enterprise."'68 Understandably, creditors
ceased to rely on legal
capital rules; they developed other mechanisms to protect
69
their investments.
In 1980, the Committee on Corporate Law of the American Bar Association
acknowledged that legal capital rules were technical and arcane, and completely
revised the financial provisions in the MBCA 7 ° Under the revised rules, the
traditional legal capital structure was eliminated. The new rules regulating

163

Bayless Manning, Assets In and Assets Out: Chapter VI of the Revised Model Business

CorporationAct, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1527, 1528 (1985).
164

Eisenberg, supra note 101, at 199.

165

See Maxey, supra note 87, at 951 n.143.

166

MANNING

167

Id.

168

Id. at 39. The legal capital rules may still provide some protection; however, it is mostly that

& HANKS, supra note 155, at 91.

of historic precedent and psychological effect. Id. at 91-92.
169

Id. at 98-114. Today, creditors generally use guarantees, secured loans, and stringent default

provisions to protect their interests.
170

See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct -

Amendments to FinancialProvisions,34 Bus. LAw. 1867 (1979).
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shareholder pay-in and pay-out rules were simplified, and 17reflect "modem thought
and practice in corporation law, finance and accounting." '
The amendments to the financial provisions of the [MBCA] reflect
a complete modernization of all provisions of the [MBCA]
concerning financial matters, including (a) the elimination of the
outmoded concepts of stated capital and par value, (b) the
definition of 'distribution' as a broad term governing dividends,
share repurchases and similar actions that should be governed by
the same standard, (c) the reformulation of the statutory standards
governing the making of distributions, (d) the elimination of the
concept of treasury stock. 172
Additional refinements were made when the RMBCA was promulgated in 1984."73
Traditional legal capital requirements do not exist in other West Virginia
business entity law. In fact, there are very few rules dictating capital requirements
in other West Virginia business entity law. West Virginia's Uniform Partnership
Act requires partnership accounts; however, this is not truly a requirement because
the partners may agree otherwise. 74 The LLP and PLLC statutes require each LLP
and PLLC to maintain at least one million dollars of liability insurance or otherwise
reserved funds. 75 West Virginia's Uniform Limited Liability Company Act does
impose limitations on distributions to members;'76 however, these limitations are
modeled on the revised capital rules found in the RMBCA, not the archaic legal
capital restrictions. At least in other business entity law, the state legislature has not
deemed detailed legal capital requirements necessary.
The continued inclusion of traditional legal capital rules in the Act does not
further the purpose of West Virginia corporate law. While those who have worked
with the provisions for many years have mastered the intricate requirements, the

171

MANNING & HANKS, supra note 155, at 177.

172

See Committee on Corporate Laws, supranote 170, at 1867.

173

MANNING & HANKS, supra note 155, at 177. Still further amendments were made to the

RMBCA in 1987. Id.
174

See W.VA. CODE §47B-4-1(a) (Supp. 1996) (requiring capital accounts); W. VA. CODE §

47B-1-4 (Supp. 1996) (permitting partners to agree otherwise).
175

See W. VA. CODE § 47B-10-5 (Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 31B-13 (1996).

176

See W. VA. CODE § 31B-4-406 (1996).
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rules are technical and difficult to follow which does not promote careful
observance of the corporate law. More importantly, the rules are archaic and
ineffectual and add unnecessary costs for the corporation. Particularly as there are
many other options - incorporation in another state or formation of another entity
form in the state - the rules discourage incorporation in the state. When organizers
of business can choose to incorporate in different states or form a different entity
within the same state, they will not choose to incorporate under a law that imposes
technical, archaic provisions which are not only difficult to follow, but ineffectual
in the end.
2.

Cumulative Voting

When electing directors, cumulative voting provides each shareholder with
as many votes as she has shares, multiplied by the number of directors to be elected,
and permits the shareholder to distribute those votes in any manner among the
candidates.' 77 West Virginia is one of the six states that mandates cumulative
voting."7
The state has constitutionally required cumulative voting since its
inception.'79 This constitutional mandate is codified in the Act.'

177

See CLARK, supranote 45, § 9.1 (1986); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF

CORPORATIONS, § 189 (3d ed. 1983); CHARLES M. WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS,

40-42 (1951). For a comparison of straight and cumulative voting, see June A. Striegel, Comment,
Cumulative Voting, Yesterday and Today: The July, 1986Amendments to Ohio's GeneralCorporation
Law, 55 U. CiN. L. REv. 1265, 1265-66 (1987).
178

Arizona, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and West Virginia. See Gordon,

supra note 58, at 181 (appendix I). Cumulative voting is a constitutional requirement in all six states.
Id None of these states is deemed an important commercial state. Id. at 165. "No important corporate
law jurisdiction maintained mandatory cumulative voting." Id. at 145.
179

See W. VA.. CONST. art. XI, § 4. For the text of this section, see supra note 57. For a history

of cumulative voting in West Virginia, see Sate ex rel Dewey PortlandCement Co. v. O'Brien, 96
S.E.2d 171, 174-180 (1956).
180

See W. VA. CODE § 31-1-93 (1996).

Voting of Shares.... At each election for directors every shareholder entitled to
vote at such election shall have the right to vote, in person or by proxy, the
number of shares owned by him for as many persons as there are directors to be
elected and for whose election he has a right to vote, or to cumulate his votes by
giving one candidate as many votes as the number of such directors multiplied by
the same number of his shares shall equal, or by distributing such votes on the
same principle among any number of such candidates.
Id. (emphasis added).
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A shareholder's right to manage corporate affairs is limited to voting.
Shareholders generally vote for the election and removal of directors, and for
fundamental change to the corporation.' Traditionally, when voting, a shareholder
is entitled to one vote for each share she owns.' Cumulative voting is a statutory
It arose
creation that evolved as a means of facilitating minority representation.'

during an era when market liquidity was limited; therefore, there was a particular
need to protect minority shareholders.'
Initially cumulative voting was well received. By the 1940s, almost half the

states had mandatory cumulative voting.

5

The original MBCA called for

86

mandatory cumulative voting
However, as a result of a series of proxy fights for
corporate control, by the 1950s the tide began to turn." 7 In 1955, the MBCA
renounced mandatory cumulative voting, providing instead for a state by state
election.'8 8 Since then, the trend away from mandatory cumulative voting became

181

For example, under the Act, shareholders are entitled to vote on matters submitted to a vote

at a meeting of shareholders. See W. VA. CODE § 31-1-93 (1996). This usually includes electing and
removing directors, and other fundamental changes amending the articles of incorporation, merger,
consolidation or sale of assets. See W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1-93, -96, -107, & -117 (1996).
182

See W. VA. CODE § 31-1-93 (1996); 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. § 7.21(a) (3d ed. Supp.

1995).
Gordon, supra note 58, at 143 ("The objective was to protect minority interests against
overreaching by a majority); Striegel, supra note 177, at 1268-1270; 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN.
§ 7.28 (3d ed. Supp. 1995). Cumulative voting for directors developed in Illinois based on John Stuart
Mill's theory of proportionate representation. JOHN STUART MILL, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1861). See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 175, § 189 n.12; Whitney Campbell, The Originsand
183

Growth of Cumulative Votingfor Directors, 10 BUS. LAW. 3, 4-6 (1955); Gordon, supranote 58, at

143.
See Gordon, supranote 58, at 173. Cumulative voting may still have a place in closely held
corporations where market liquidity tends to be limited.
184

185

Id. at 145. Thirteen states constitutionally mandated cumulative voting. See Campbell,

supranote 183, at 7.
CORP. ACT § 31,

186

MODEL Bus.

187

Gordon, supra note 58, at 148-151.

188

Id. at 152 n.83. See also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 33,

4 (1950).
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even more pronounced.' 89 The RMBCA currently provides that if a corporation
wants cumulative voting, it must "opt in" to cumulative voting.'

The arguments for and against mandatory cumulative voting have been well
recounted. Proponents argue that mandatory cumulative voting provides minority
representation in corporate management and permits early detection and deterrence
of unacceptable behavior.1 91 Opponents counter that mandatory cumulative voting

interferes with effective decision making, limits management's freedom to operate
the business and makes the corporation vulnerable to takeover 92 Although
cumulative voting is likely to improve shareholder welfare in certain corporations,
qualitative evidence indicates that all else being equal, management is unlikely to
incorporate in a state which mandates cumulative voting. 3
Eliminating mandatory cumulative voting does not necessarily mean
eliminating shareholder protection. Many other mechanisms can protect minority

shareholders. If the corporation has a liquid market, the shareholder may always
sell her shares. Additionally, other statutory provisions, including increased
disclosure requirements, more precise standards of conduct for directors, and
dissenter's rights can protect minority shareholders.
Although West Virginia mandates cumulative voting, anecdotal evidence
indicates that shareholders do not exercise this right. 94 If in fact shareholders are

189

Id. at 145.

RMBCA § 7.28 provides "(a) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation,
directors are elected by a plurality of votes cast by the shares entitled to vote.... (b) Shareholders do
not have a right to cumulate their votes for directors unless the articles of incorporation so provide."
2 MODEL Bus. CoRp. ACTANN. § 7.28 (3d ed. Supp. 1995).
190

Gordon, supra note 58, at 146 (noting that cumulative voting helps prevents management
entrenchment); John G. Sobieski, In Supportof Cumulative Voting, 15 Bus. LAW. 316 (1960); Charles
W. Steadman, Should Cumulative Votingfor Directorsbe Mandatory?-A Debate, 11 Bus. LAW. 9
191

(1955); George H. Young, The Case ForCumulative Voting, 1950 Wis L. REV. 49.

Ralph E. Axley, The Case Against Cumulative Voting, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 278; George D.
Gibson, Should Cumulative Votingfor Directorsbe Mandatory?- A Debate 11 Bus Law 22 (1955);
Gordon, supra note 78, at 146 (explaining that cumulative voting prevents disruption by willful
minority); Striegel, supranote 177, at 1270; Herbert F. Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An
192

Anachronism, 16 Bus. LAW. 550 (1961).

See Gordon, supra note 58, at 148. Numerous corporations have reincorporated to eliminate
cumulative voting, and several states, including California, Ohio, Illinois and Missouri have revised
their corporate law to eliminate mandatory cumulative voting. See id. at 156-160 (appendix II).
193

194

This is based on my conversations with various members of the West Virginia bar.
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aware of their right, it is questionable whether they understand it. 9 This
conclusion is supported by several facts. First,unlike the RMBCA, the cumulative
voting requirement is not highlighted in a separate provision. Instead it is buried
in the fourth paragraph of the voting of shares provision, which contains nine
paragraphs and no subheadings or subsections.196 Second, although the statute
includes the word "cumulate" in its expression of the mechanism, the wording is
less than clear, especially to the average shareholder for whom this right is created.
Cumulative voting is confusing. The concept and process is difficult for lawyers
who have studied it, let alone people who have not. Third, in practice, cumulative
voting can turn the election process into a confusing numbers jumble. 97 This is
especially true in West Virginia because there is no requirement that shareholders
who intend to exercise this right give advance notice to the inspector of election.
Cumulative voting is constitutionally mandated in West Virginia
corporations; however, this restriction does not exist in the state's other business
entity laws. Although the state's partnership law provides a default rule that every
partner has an equal say in management, the law also permits partners to agree
otherwise. 9 Additionally, West Virginia law does not mandate cumulative voting
in manager-managed limited liability companies. If members want this right, they
must contract for it.
Cumulative voting is certainly appropriate in certain corporations. As a
prophylactic requirement, however, it undercuts the purpose of West Virginia
corporate law. First, careful observance of a provision that is not clearly stated is
difficult. Second, mandated cumulative voting is generally disfavored by organizers
of business and management and therefore, is likely to discourage incorporation in
the state.1 99 Third, if the legislature intends to protect minority representation in
management, protection should be fostered consistently among the state's other
business entity statutes. The failure to do so permits management to avoid the
restriction by choosing a business entity other than the corporation.

See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. D'Annunzio, 524 F. Supp. 694 (N.D.W. Va. 1981)
("Holland and the other shareholders of West Union... came to the further realization of cumulative
195

voting under West Virginia law.").
196

See W. VA. CODE § 31-1-93 (1996). See also supra Part V.A.1.

197

See Sturdy, supra note 192, at 565.

198

See W. VA. CODE § 47B-4-1(f) (1996).

199

See supra note 193. Wall Street tends to disfavor cumulative voting. See Sturdy, supra note

192, at 550.
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Right to Dissent

The right to dissent is a statutory "buy-out" provision; it is designed to
provide minority shareholders with liquidity?"0 The Act provides the limited

dissenter's rights found in the MBCA. ° ' A shareholder may dissent only in the
event of "(a) [a]ny plan of merger or consolidation to which the corporation is a
party; or (b) any sale or exchange of all or substantially all the property and assets

of the corporation .... ""
This was a marked change from the historic rule that fundamental changes

to the corporation required the unanimous consent of all shareholders.2 ' Unanimity
was essential because fundamental changes altered the nature of a shareholder's
investment?04 In effect, this unanimity requirement provided every shareholder
with a veto. In other words, a single shareholder could block fundamental corporate
change. Not surprisingly, this created tension between shareholders and
management. Recognizing that shareholder protection could be provided via other
mechanisms, the MBCA provided management with greater flexibility by requiring

200

Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate

Law, 84 GEORGETOwN L.J. 1, 18 (1995).
201

Compare MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 81 (2d ed. 1971) and W. VA. CODE § 31-1-122

(1996).
202

See W. VA.

CODE

§ 31-1-122 (1996). W.

VA. CODE

§ 31-1-123 (1996), provides the

mechanism that dissenting shareholders must follow. This mechanism follows the MBCA. See
MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT ANN.§ 81 (2d ed. 1971). The RMBCA revised the mechanism to provide a
more workable process. See 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT chapter 13, subchapter B (3d ed. Supp. 1995).
For a discussion on West Virginia Code section 31-1-123, see Fair Value of Shares of Bank of Ripley,
399 S.E.2d 678 (W. Va. 1990).
203

WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, 12 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5906.10

(1993).
204

"[E]ach shareholder had a contractual right to continue in the enterprise as originally

chartered, and could not be forced to invest in a different business." Recent Developments, Corporate
Fusion by Sale of Assets and Dissolution Held Free From DelawareStatutory Right of Appraisal
Despite Claims of DeFactoMerger, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1135, 1136 (1963). See HODGE O'NEAL &
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEALS' OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 5.03 (2d ed. 1991).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss1/7

42

Cohen: West Virginia Corporate Law: Is It "Broke"?

1997]

WEST VIRGINIA CORPORATE LAW

majority approval for fundamental change.0 5 To protect minority shareholders, the
MBCA provided dissenter's rights. 0 6 Dissenter's rights
balance the interests of the majority, who wished to reorganize the
corporation to better serve their purposes, with the interests of the
minority, who either desired to retain the basic characteristics of
the company in which they had invested or to receive the fair value
of their investment as an alternative.0 7
Minority shareholders could no longer block fundamental changes; however, at
least under certain circumstances, they were protected as they had the right to
withdraw their investment from the corporation at a fair value. 0 8
The Act permits a shareholder to dissent from specified corporate action a merger, consolidation, or sale or exchange of all or substantially all of the assets
of the corporation. 2 9 The provision, however, is incomplete. It does not provide
dissenter's rights for all corporate action in which a minority shareholder may be
subjected to fundamental change. Under the Act, a shareholder of a corporation
which is merged will have dissenter's rights; however the shareholder of a
corporation which is a party to a share exchange will not.2? 0 The end of these two
transactions is identical, yet careful structuring by management can avoid
dissenter's rights. Adequate dissenter's rights for minority shareholders are
particulary important because most West Virginia corporations have a limited
market for their shares.21

205

See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 73 (2d ed. 1971). See also 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT

ANN. § 1103 (3d ed. Supp. 1995); 2 ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, chapter 4, introductory note (1994).
206

See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 80, 81 (2d ed. 1971); FLETCHER, supra note 203,

§

5906.10.
207

Henry F. Johnson & Paul Bartlett, Jr., Is a Fistful of Dollarsthe Answer? A CriticalLook

at Dissenters' Rights Under the Revised Model Business CorporationAct, 12 J.L. & COM. 211, 213

(1993).
208

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 80, 81 (2d ed. 1971).

209

See supra note 201 and accompanying text.

210

See W. VA. CODE § 31-1-122 (1996). When possible, management would like to avoid

dissenter's rights. The potential cost creates uncertainty.
211

See supra note 79.
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If dissenter's rights are intended to provide shareholders with protection
against fundamental changes to their investment, dissenter's rights should cover all
fundamental changes. When revising the MBCA, the drafters recognized -this
limitation and added additional transactions for which dissenter's rights exist."'
The additional events include a share exchange, amendments to the articles of
incorporation that impair a shareholder's rights as a shareholder in certain
enumerated ways, and any other corporate action to the extent dissenter's rights
23
were provided by the articles, bylaws or resolution of the board of directors. ,
These additions may not address all fundamental changes which should give rise to
dissenter's rights; however, they are a step in that direction.1 4
No other West Virginia business entity law provides the right to dissent;
however, they all have more expansive "buy-out" provisions than the Act.
Historically the partnership statute did not provide a buy-out provision. If a partner
wanted to leave the partnership, she had to dissolve it. Under the revised
partnership statute, however, there are provisions for purchasing a disassociated
partner's interest at her request.2" 5 Additionally, West Virginia's LLC act provides
broad repurchase rights for a disassociated member? 6
The right of shareholders to dissent is designed to provide minority
shareholders with liquidity. However, when compared to the buy-out provisions in
other West Virginia business entity statutes, this is not an especially flexible "buyout" provision. Unlike the other provisions discussed in this Article, this provision
may in fact promote the purpose of the Act. Management views limited dissenter's
as a positive attribute. Limited dissenter's rights increases management flexibility.
Management can structure a fundamental change to a shareholder's interest so that

212

"The 1978 revision of the [MBCA] ...

sought to increase the frequency with which

assertion of dissenters' rights leads to economical and satisfying solutions." Johnson & Bartlett, supra
note 206, at 213. Business CorporationAct, 12 J.L. & COM 211, 213 (1993). The revision also
attempts to decrease the frequency with which the assertion of dissenters' rights leads to delay, expense
and dissatisfaction. See 3 MODEL. Bus. CORP. ACTANN. § 13.01 (3d ed. Supp. 1995).
213

See 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.02(a) (3d ed. Supp. 1995).

214

The American Law Institute ("ALl") has drafted an appraisal remedy which it believes to be

more inclusive.

See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
According to a survey by the American Bar Association, all states
have a statute that provides dissenter's rights; however, the circumstances under which dissenter's
rights are available vary. See id. at reporters' note to chapter 4 (1994).
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.21 (1994).

215

See W. VA. CODE § 47B-7-1 (1996).

216

See

W. VA. CODE

§ 31B-7-701 (1996).
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it does not trigger a shareholder's right to dissent. 217 A shareholder can be stuck
holding shares of a corporation which has fundamentally changed. This may not,

as a matter of public policy, adequately protect minority shareholders.
4.

Duty of Care

Directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation.2 8 This fiduciary
responsibility is inherent to the relationship between the director and the
corporation and its shareholders; it is also fundamental to the functioning of a

corporation. Generally, directors have a duty to act within their authority, exercise
due care and act fairly and in good faith.219 The duty of care on which this Article
focuses holds directors liable "for negligence in the performance of their corporate

duties."2 ° With the exception of a provision providing for director liability with

respect to certain distributions,"22 the Act is silent as to a director's duty of care.
In addition to the lack of statutory guidance, to date, there is no judicial guidance.'m
Historically, the duty of care was defined at common law on a case-by-case

basis.'

As often occurs in case-by-case determinations, there was no uniformity,

and in turn, no predictability.'

217

Although each standard involved some degree of

See Farris v. Glen Alden, 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958).

Historically, directors were viewed as agents or trustees of the corporation. Today courts
characterize directors as "fiduciaries who have a 'distinct legal relationship' with the corporation."
Marcia M. McMurray, Note, An HistoricalPerspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty ofLoyalty, and
the Business JudgmentRule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605, 605-06 (1987).
218

219

HENN & ALEXANDER supra note 176, at §§ 231-235.

220

Id. at § 234.

221

See W. VA. CODE § 31-1-102 (1996).

222

There are no reported state decisions setting forth a common law standard of care for

directors of West Virginia corporation.
223

McMurray, supra note 218.

See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACTANN. § 41, 2 cmt. (2d ed. 1971). The standard for the duty
of care has been described in several ways. See Anderson v. Akers, 7 F. Supp 924 (W.D. Ky. 1934),
modified sub nom. Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1936), modifiedsub nom. Anderson
v. Atherton, 302 U.S. 643 (1937) (a reasonably prudent person); Medfort Trust Co. v. McKnight 197
N.E. 649 (Mass. 1935) (gross negligence standard); Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 23 A. 405 (Pa. 1892)
(only liable for fraud). See also HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 176, at 622-623. A lack of
predictability undercuts the purpose of substantive law. See supranote 7 and accompanying text.
224
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negligence, divergent standards arose?' Today, a majority of states have codified
the common law duty of care. 226
A statutory duty of care was first inserted in the MBCA in 1974.227 When
the committee revised the MBCA, it retained substantially the same language.22 8
The standard requires a director to act with the care that "an ordinarily prudent
director in a like position would use under similar circumstances.' 9 The standard

essentially codifies one of the common law standard of conduct for directors. It is
important to note that the standard is procedural; it focuses on the manner in which
a director acts, not on the validity of her decisions."O Directors are not "insurers
and are not liable for errors ofjudgment or mistakes while acting with reasonable
diligence, care and skill."'

West Virginia law remains all but silent on the duty of care standard for
corporate directors; 232 however, all other West Virginia business entity law provides

McMurray, supra note 218, at 607 (discussing "three common-law standards... (1) only
the degree of care required to avoid gross negligence, (2) the degree of care that an ordinarily prudent
director in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, and (3) the degree of care that
an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in conducting personal business affairs").
225

See Bradley & Schipani, supra note 19, at 18 n.107; 2 ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Part IV, introductory note, at 34 (1994) ("In the
past 25 years,... over two-thirds of the states have enacted statutory provisions concerning the duty
of care.").
226

The committee approved a second paragraph to MBCA section 35 Board of Directors on
September 21, 1974. See Report of Committee on CorporateLaws: Changes in the Model Business
CorporationAct, 30 Bus. LAw. 501 (1975). Although the duty of care was added to the MBCA prior
to the effective date of the Act, it is not included in the Act. The Act was modeled on an earlier version
of the MBCA. As of December 1, 1994, 41 jurisdictions impose a statutory standard similar to the
RMBCA standard. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACTANN. § 8.30 statutory comparison (3d ed. Supp. 1995).
227

. See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30(a) (3d ed. Supp. 1995). "[T]he changes made
by section 8.30(a) in its final form from section 35 are primarily stylistic, and designed to place section
8.30(a) in the same format at the balance of the revised Model Act." 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
§ 8.30 annotation -historical background (Supp. 1995).
228

BUS. CORP. ACT § 35, 2 (2d ed. 1977). Most states have adopted this standard.
McMurray, supra note 218, at 608.
229

MODEL

McMurray, supra note 218, at 613-614 (noting that directors are not liable for honest
mistakes or judgment errors).

230

supra note 176, § 234.

231

HENN & ALEXANDER,

232

See supranote 221 and accompanying text.
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an express and exclusive duty of care standard. This standard requires that anyone
who manages an entity must refrain "from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless
'
This standard
conduct, intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law."233
provides entity owners and managers with ascertainable, predictable standards to

guide behavior. Additionally, both West Virginia's partnership statute and LLC

statute permit the owners to, within reason, modify the duty of care 4 This reflects
the modem trend towards enabling legislation; specific default rules that may be
modified.
This lack of consistency among the state's business entity statutes is
troublesome. Anyone who manages a business entity owes a fiduciary duty of care
to the owners. This duty should not vary depending on the entity chosen 5 When
it does, managers can, through careful selection of an entity, avoid the duty without
owner agreement.
Additionally, the lack of an express duty of care standard in the Act leaves
directors adrift. Other West Virginia business entity statutes provide an express
standard of care; however, corporate directors are left not knowing to what standard

they must comply. No director wants to function under an unknown standard.
Given a choice, organizers of business activity who wish to function under a
specified duty of care, or an agreed upon duty of care, may do so by forming a LLC
or partnership. Therefore, the omission of a duty of care standard in the Act hinders
the purpose of the Act.

W.
V33
VA. CODE § 47B-4-4(c) (Supp. 1996) (setting forth a partner's duty of care to the
partnership and other partners); W. VA. CODE § 3 1B-4-409(c) (1996) (setting forth a member's duty
of care to the LLC (and other members) in a member-managed LLC, and a manager's duty of loyalty
to the LLC (and other members) in a manager-managed LLC). In theory, this duty of care standard
also applies to West Virginia Limited Partnerships in accordance with West Virginia Code section 479-63; unfortunately, the provision has not been revised and still refers to the repealed partnership act
(47-8A-1 et. seq.). See supra note 81.
2

234

See W. VA. CODE § 31B-1-103(b)(3) (1996) ("(b) The operating agreement may not... (3)

Unreasonably reduce the duty of care under section 4-409(c) or 6-603(b)(3)."); W. VA. CODE § 47B-13(b)(4) (Supp. 1996) ("(b) The partnership agreement may not... (4) Unreasonably reduce the duty
of care under subsection (c), section four, article four or subdivision (3), subsection (b), section three,
article six of this chapter."). To date, there is no precedent in the state of what would constitute an
unreasonable reduction of the duty of care.
See William H. Clark, Jr., What the Business World is Lookingfor in an Organizational
Form: The Pennsylvania Experience,32 WAKE FOREST L. REV.149, 172 (1997).
235

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1997

47

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:5

VI. CONCLUSION

Organizers of economic activity have more options than ever before. If they
wish to form a corporation, they may incorporate under the law of the state with the
most advantageous corporate law. If they wish to organize a business entity under
the laws of West Virginia, they may choose the entity that provides the desired
characteristics and most advantageous law. Given this flexibility, organizers are
unlikely to incorporate under the Act. The organization of the Act is confusing and
difficult to work with. Many of the standards set forth in the Act, like the legal
capital rules and mandatory cumulative voting, are technical and archaic. Yet other
standards articulated in the Act, like the right to dissent and the fiduciary duty
provisions, lack specificity. In the context in which it functions, the Act does not
further its purpose - to promote more careful observance of the law and to
encourage businesses to incorporate in the state and, thereby generate additional
revenue. Therefore, the Act is "broke!"
Despite the fact that by my definition the Act is "broke," corporations
continue to be formed and function under it.6 The final question, then, is do the
potential gains from revising the Act outweigh the inevitable transaction costs? The
answer lies in a reevaluation of the purpose of the Act.
Promoting careful observance of law is a fundamental goal of all statutory
law. In furtherance of this goal, the legislature should always strive to produce well
drafted statutes. Well drafted statutes are more likely to advance their substantive
purpose.
The goal to encourage incorporation in West Virginia and thereby generate
additional revenue, however, requires further analysis. The value of encouraging
incorporation in the state to generate revenue turns on the answer to two questions.
First, can West Virginia encourage incorporation in the state over incorporation in
other states. Second, where does the Act fit in the spectrum of West Virginia
business entity law. There are three alternatives: (1) to encourage incorporation in
the state over the formation of other types of entities, (2) to encourage the formation
of other types of entities over incorporation, or (3) to create a neutral set of business
entity laws that makes the entity decisions solely a question of business judgment.
With respect to the first issue, West Virginia is not considered a
commercial state. To even attempt to compete in the market for corporate charters,
the state would have to attract managers from other states to incorporate here. To
achieve this goal, the state would have to transform itself into a haven for
corporations. This would require more than the adoption of contemporary standards
- it would require anticipating and providing the next wave of pro-management
236

This is attributable to inertia, cost of conversion, concern regarding untested statutes. See

supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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enabling legislation. Many of these standards would infringe even more on
shareholder Welfare and creditor protection, and, as a matter of public policy, may
be unacceptable.
Recognizing this limitation, however, does not mean that West Virginia
should stop seeking to obtain and retain its share of corporate charters. Rather it
suggests that the purpose should be narrowed. Instead of seeking to generate
revenue by luring incorporations from other states, West Virginia should focus on
encouraging local businesses that have decided to incorporate to do so in the state.
As West Virginia primarily has closely held corporations,1 7 I suggest that the
legislature revise the Act to deal specifically with closely held corporations. As
very few corporate codes are directed towards closely held corporations, West
Virginia could create a statute which would serve its constituency and potentially
create a niche market that might actually attract incorporations from other states. 8
With respect to the second issue, the legislature needs to create a consistent
legislative policy with respect to business entities. Unfortunately, because the state
consistently adopts uniform legislation, it has never established an overriding policy
with respect to business organizations. Without an express policy, it is difficult to
assess whether the current business entity statutes advance the state's policies and
interests. Even if some do, the lack of consistency among entities permits
organizers of business to avoid potentially important legislative policy.
Although some commentators argue that revising the Act is a waste of
time; 9 I disagree. While changing tax rates and check-the-box taxation may make
one form of entity more favorable than another, these trends tend to evolve over
time. At this juncture, even though LLCs and LLPs are being haled as the wave of
the future, corporations are still thriving entities and are likely to remain so for the
foreseeable future.240 The next step is for the West Virginia Law Institute. The
Institute should analyze the role of business entities in the state. Based on this
Closely held corporations are much more prevalent than publicly traded corporations. Nearly

237

90% of all corporations are closely held. See 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S
CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.19, at 108 (3d ed. 1992). As indicated earlier, there are less than 20
publicly traded corporations incorporated in West Virginia. See supra note 79.
Less than half the states have close corporation statutes; furthermore, where adopted, they

238

are rarely used. See Ayres, supra note 42, at 377 n.49. Professor Ayres argues that there is little
incentive for state legislatures to create corporate laws directed towards closely held corporations. See

id. at 376.
239

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.

See Keatinge, supranote 26, at 234-237. Some commentators would argue that some of the
newer entities may lose their appeal in the wake of check-the box. Oesterle & Gazuer, supra note 28,
at 214.
240
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analysis, the Institute should articulate a purpose that can then be used to draft and
revise West Virginia business entity law.
At a minimum the Act should be reorganized. A revised organization which
groups related provisions together, uses subheadings and a consistent drafting style,
would create a more readable statute. This in turn would promote careful
observance of the law. Hopefully, more substantive revisions will also be made. In
assessing possible substantive revisions, shareholder welfare must be balanced
against management flexibility. Attention must also be given to consistency with
the state's other business entity statues.
This Article has highlighted a few of the many areas where I would
recommend substantive revision to the Act. The legal capital rules should be
eliminated. The revised Act should provide more realistic and effective capital
structure provisions. Mandatory cumulative voting should be eliminated. I
recognize that this would require a constitutional amendment therefore, at least in
the short run, this may not be feasible. In the interim, or in the event that the state
elects to maintain mandatory cumulative voting, the revised Act should provide
better crafted provisions which explain the right so that it is used under appropriate
circumstances. Dissenter's rights should also be revised to include additional
circumstances which warrant a legislatively mandated "buy-out" for minority
shareholders. Finally, an articulate statement of the duty of care should be
developed. However, the particulars of these revisions have been left for future
discussion.
If substantive revision is undertaken, appropriate provisions must be
drafted. The contemporary standards reflected in the RMBCA are a good starting
point, but I do not recommend adoption of the RMBCA. Although this would
reduce the transaction costs in both drafting and interpreting the statute, it would
not necessarily provide the desired results; particularly if West Virginia opts to
create a corporate law which deals with issues specific to closely held
corporations.2 41

241

See supranotes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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